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FLORIDA TAKEOVER LAW: CONTROL-SHARE
ACQUISITIONS
ROBERT C. RASMUSSEN* AND JEFFERY M. FULLER**
Under Florida's new control-share acquisition law, a shareholder's
right to vote will be determined in certain circumstances by a vote of
the other shareholders. Merrs. Rasmussen and Fuller contend that
the commerce clause precludes the law's interference with interstate
commerce, that the law might be preempted by the Williams Act,
and that the law's validity is questionable on other constitutional
grounds. The authors also suggest answers to the many questions
they raise regarding ambiguities in the law, and offer advice for both
potential targets and stock acquirers on how to comply with the law.
THE STORM of corporate takeover activity during the last twenty-
five years has generated a wave of state and federal laws.' In particu-
lar, target companies have sought shelter from hostile tender offers
and state legislatures have responded with a variety of anti-takeover
laws.2 This Article reviews the regulation of corporate takeovers in
Florida under the "control-share acquisition" provision of the Florida
General Corporation Act.3 This statutory provision is one of two cor-
porate laws enacted as of July 2, 1987, to regulate corporate takeovers
in Florida. 4
* Partner, Glenn, Rasmussen, Fogarty, Merryday & Russo, Tampa, Florida. B.S.B.A.,
1971, American University; J.D., 1974, University of Iowa.
** Associate Attorney, Glenn, Rasmussen, Fogarty, Merryday & Russo, Tampa, Flor-
ida. B.A., 1980, University of South Florida; J.D., M.B.A., 1984, University of Florida. The
authors gratefully acknowledge the timely and tireless assistance of Robert W. Bivins and
Frances Peters.
1. See 9 Sec. & Fed. Corp. L. Rep. (Clark Boardman) 73 (1987).
2. Id. Many state takeover laws were the result of pending hostile takeovers of signifi-
cant local businesses. For example, Minnesota convened a special session of its legislature to
strengthen its takeover laws when the Dart Group initiated a takeover of Dayton Hudson
Corp., a local department store. Wall St. J., June 23, 1987, at 12, col. 1. Indiana adopted its
takeover law to respond to a possible hostile takeover of Arvin Industries, Inc. Id., July 1,
1987, at 1, col. 6. Washington passed its law to protect Boeing Co. from a threatened bid.
Cahan, States vs. Raiders: Will Washington Step In?, Bus. WK., Aug. 31, 1987, at 56. Flori-
da's new takeover law is no exception and was enacted to protect Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
Inc., a significant business headquartered in Orlando, Florida. Labaton, States Protect
Merger Targets, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1987, at 18, col. 1.
3. FLA. STAT. ch. 607 (1987).
4. Ch. 87-257, 1987 Fla. Laws 1785 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 607.108-.110, 607.244,
607.247 (1987)).
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The first of these laws, the Affiliated Transactions Law, regulates
the exercise of corporate control by requiring the approval of "affili-
ated transactions" by either a majority of the disinterested directors
of the corporation or by two-thirds of the voting stock of the corpora-
tion, excluding shares owned by interested shareholders.5 The stated
purpose of the Affiliated Transactions Law is to assure that share-
holders in a hostile takeover receive a fair price in a second-step
merger. 6
The second new law, the Control-Shares Acquisition Law (the Act),
regulates the acquisition of corporate control by denying voting rights
to "control shares" unless the preexisting shareholders of the corpo-
ration reinstate those voting rights. 7 The Act's purpose is to protect
Florida shareholders by affording them an opportunity to decide
whether a change in corporate control pursuant to a tender offer is
desirable.8 The Act represents a legislative attempt to place existing
shareholders on an equal footing with a takeover bidder. Both the Act
and the Affiliated Transactions Law apply to Florida corporations
and to certain foreign corporations that have been granted authority
to transact business in Florida and have statutorily prescribed rela-
tionships with Florida. 9
This Article begins by reviewing the history of corporate takeover
regulation both in Florida and nationwide, and by highlighting recent
state and federal legislative developments. A summary of the Act, in-
cluding an analysis of interpretative issues, follows. The Article then
addresses the validity and constitutionality of the Act under state and
federal law, succeeded by a synopsis of relevant public policy consid-
5. FLA. STAT. § 607.108(1)-(6) (1987). The Affiliated Transactions Law applies to transac-
tions between a corporation and any beneficial owner of more than 10% of its outstanding
voting stock or any affiliate or associate of that beneficial owner (i.e., "interested party"). Id. §
607.108(l)(a), (b), (d), (k). For a discussion of the Affiliated Transactions Law, see Ames, Flori-
da's New Law Governing Corporate Takeovers, 62 FLA. BAR J., Feb. 1988, at 57.
6. Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Commerce, HB 358 (1987) Staff Analysis 4-5 (final June
22, 1987) (on file with committee) [hereinafter House Staff Analysis].
7. FLA. STAT. § 607.109(5) (1987).
8. House Staff Analysis, supra note 6, at 3-4.
9. FLA. STAT. § 607.110 (1987). In general, a foreign corporation (one incorporated in a
state other than Florida) is subject to both the Act and the Affiliated Transactions Law if it has
the following characteristics: (a) it has been granted authority to transact business in Florida by
the Florida Department of State; (b) it has 100 or more shareholders; (c) it has its principal
office, principal place of business, or substantial assets within Florida; (d) it has more than 500
Florida residents as employees; (e) its annual gross payroll for Florida residents is more than $5
million; and (f) it has any of the following shareholder connections with Florida: (i) more than
1,000 of its shareholders are resident in Florida; (ii) more than 10% of its shareholders are resi-
dent in Florida; (iii) more than 10% of its shares are owned by Florida residents. Id. §§
607.109(4), .110(l)-(2).
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erations and pending federal legislation. Finally, guidelines for com-
plying with the Act are suggested.
I. HISTORY OF TAKEOVER LAWS
In the sixties, corporate takeover activity began to attract the atten-
tion of federal and state lawmakers. In an effort to regulate these cor-
porate takeovers, a number of statutes were adopted and focused
primarily on the tender offer.
A. Federal Takeover Laws
The Williams Act, adopted in 1968 in response to an increasing
number of cash tender offers, amended sections 13 and 14 of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). 10 Section 13(d)(1) of
the Exchange Act requires a person acquiring the beneficial ownership
of more than 5% of any class of equity security registered pursuant to
section 12 of the Exchange Act to file a Schedule 13D with the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) within ten days after the last
acquisition." Section 14(d)(1) of the Exchange Act requires any per-
son who makes a tender offer that will result in the person beneficially
owning more than 5% of any class of equity security registered pursu-
ant to section 12 of the Exchange Act to file concurrently with the
SEC a Schedule 14D-1.12
The Williams Act was passed to "insure that public shareholders
who are confronted by a cash tender offer for their stock will not be
required to respond without adequate information regarding the qual-
ifications and intentions of the offering party."' 3 The disclosure re-
quired by the Williams Act includes the following information: (1) the
identity of each purchaser; (2) the amount and source of the funds to
be used to make the purchases; and (3) the purpose of the purchases,
including any plans to make any major change in the target corpora-
tion's business or corporate structure.' 4 The tender offeror must file
this information with the SEC when the tender offer is commenced. 5
10. Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, §§ 2, 3, 82 Stat. 454, 455-56 (current version at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 632 (1982); Piper
v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 22-24 (1977).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l, -101 (1987).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(l) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1, -100 (1987).
13. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975). See also H.R. REP. No.
1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4 (1968).
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(1)(A)-(E), 78n(d)(1) (1982). The Act also requires the disclosure of
similar information. Compare id. §§ 78m(d)(l)(A)-(E), 78n(d)(1) with FLA. STAT. § 607.109(6)
(1987).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(l) (1982).
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Although the Williams Act is essentially a disclosure statute, it does
impose some substantive limitations on tender offers.' 6 A tender offer
must remain open for at least twenty business days, and a shareholder
who tenders shares pursuant to a tender offer may withdraw them at
any time while the tender offer remains open and, if the offeror has
not purchased the shares, at any time after sixty days from the com-
mencement of the tender offer. 7 If more shares are tendered than the
offeror is willing to accept, the tendered shares must be purchased on
a pro rata basis. 8 Finally, the offeror must pay the same price for all
the shares purchased pursuant to the tender offer, which must be the
highest price offered for any of the tendered shares.' 9
B. State Takeover Laws
States also began to regulate tender offers around the time the Wil-
liams Act was adopted.20 The first state takeover laws generally had
precommencement filing requirements that acted to delay the com-
mencement of a tender offer. 2' These laws also gave state officials
broad powers, including the right to request disclosure of information
beyond that required by the Williams Act and the right to determine
the fairness of a tender offer. 22 Some state takeover laws also applied
to foreign corporations and nonresident shareholders. 23 Following Ed-
gar v. MITE Corp. ,24 however, courts held most of these state take-
16. Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-7, 240.14e-l(a) (1987).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1987).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (1987).
20. See 9 Sec. & Fed. Corp. L. Rep. (Clark Boardman) 73 (1987). For a general discus-
sion of the history of state takeover laws, see Pinto, Takeover Statutes: The Dormant Com-
merce Clause and State Corporate Law, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 473 (1987); Warren,
Developments in State Takeover Regulation: MITE and Its Aftermath, 40 Bus. LAW. 671
(1985); Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutional-
ity, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1976).
21. See sources cited supra note 20. For a general discussion of first and second genera-
tion takeover laws, see Block, Barton & Roth, State Takeover Statutes: The "Second Genera-
tion," 13 SEC. REG. L.J. 332 (1986). See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, para. 137.53.A
(Supp. 1980) (requiring 20 days prior written notice of terms of offer).
22. See sources cited supra notes 20-21. For example, the Illinois statute allowed the Sec-
retary of State to conduct a fairness hearing concerning a tender offer and determine whether
there was full and fair disclosure to the offerees. The Secretary could also enjoin a tender
offer if the statute's requirements were not satisfied. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, para.
137.57.A, .E (Supp. 1980).
23. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, para. 137.52-10 (Supp. 1980). The Illinois law was appli-
cable to a target corporation having at least 10% of its shareholders resident in Illinois and
satisfying any two of the three following conditions: (i) its principal executive office was lo-
cated in Illinois; (ii) it was organized under Illinois law; or (iii) 10% of its stated capital and
paid-in surplus was represented in Illinois. Id.
24. 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (plurality decision).
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over laws unconstitutional as undue burdens on interstate commerce.25
In MITE, a cash tender offer for all the outstanding shares of Chi-
cago Rivet & Machine Co., an Illinois corporation, was initiated by
MITE Corporation (MITE), a Delaware corporation with its principal
office in Connecticut. 26 MITE filed with the SEC all the information
required by the Williams Act, but did not comply with the Illinois
Business Take-Over Act (Illinois Act). 27 MITE obtained a declaratory
judgment that the Illinois Act was preempted by the Williams Act and
also violated the commerce clause. 28 The district court permanently
enjoined enforcement of the Illinois Act against MITE, and the Su-
preme Court affirmed, holding the Illinois Act unconstitutional under
the commerce clause. 29
Many state legislatures responded to the MITE decision by either
amending or repealing their statutes. Ohio adopted a law requiring the
approval of the disinterested shareholders before a person could ac-
quire shares representing specified thresholds of ownership. 0 The
Ohio law applies only to Ohio corporations with fifty or more resident
shareholders and a principal place of business, principal executive of-
fice, or substantial assets in Ohio.3 The constitutionality of this law is
uncertain. Although the Sixth Circuit had decided that the law was
unconstitutional;3 2 the Supreme Court has vacated that decision for
reconsideration in light of CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Amer-
ica.3
25. E.g., Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1983) (Okla-
homa); Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1983) (Virginia); Martin-Marietta
Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982) (Michigan); National City Lines, Inc. v.
LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982) (Missouri).
26. MITE, 457 U.S. at 626-27.
27. Id. at 627-28.
28. Id. at 629.
29. Id. at 640-45. The Supreme Court held that the statute violated the commerce clause
by placing an excessive indirect burden on interstate commerce. A plurality of the court held
that the statute also violated the commerce clause by directly restraining interstate commerce.
Three justices thought the Williams Act preempted the Illinois Act. Because the Illinois Act
also applied to corporations not incorporated in Illinois and having their principal place of
business outside Illinois, the Court held that Illinois had "no interest in regulating the internal
affairs of foreign corporations." Id. at 645-46.
30. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.01, .83.1-.85 (Anderson Supp. 1986). One commenta-
tor has referred to this type of law as a "shareholder approval model." See Pinto, supra note
20, at 478-79.
31. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.01 (A), (Y) (Anderson Supp. 1986).
32. Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated and re-
manded sub noma. Ohio v. Fleet Aerospace Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1949 (1987). The court held that
the law frustrated the objectives of the Williams Act, and therefore violated the supremacy
clause. The court also held that the statute violated the commerce clause by directly regulating
and indirectly burdening interstate commerce. Holderman, 796 F.2d at 138-39.
33. Ohio v. Fleet Aerospace Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1949 (1987); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
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Other states, such as Minnesota, adopted laws requiring disclosure
to a target corporation's shareholders of information regarding the
acquirer. 34 The Minnesota Takeover Act applies to any tender offer to
purchase equity securities of a "target company" from Minnesota re-
sidents if the offeror would own more than ten percent of any class of
equity securities of the company after the tender offer is complete.3 5 If
the disclosure is inadequate or misleading, the Commissioner of Com-
merce may suspend the tender offer.3 6 This type of disclosure law has
been upheld as facially constitutional.3 7
Delaware's new state takeover law does not affect an offeror's abil-
ity to acquire or vote its shares. 38 Instead, the law prohibits a bidder
who acquires more than 1570 of a target company's stock from com-
pleting the takeover for three years unless one of the following re-
quirements is satisfied: (1) the bidder acquires 85% of the target
company's outstanding stock at one time, excluding shares held by
director-officers and shares held by employee stock option plans; (2)
the holders of two-thirds of the outstanding shares vote in favor of
the stock acquisition, excluding those shares held by the bidder; or (3)
the board of directors and shareholders decide to opt out of the law's
provisions.39 These restrictions apply only if the acquirer does not get
prior approval from the target company's board of directors. 40 New
York has a similar takeover law that is less favorable to bidders .4
Other states have adopted takeover laws that, instead of preventing
or regulating the purchase of shares, deny voting rights to those shares
unless certain conditions are satisfied. 42 These laws require the vote of
34. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 80B.03 (1986). These statutes are referred to as the "full disclosure
model." See Pinto, supra note 20, at 481.
35. MINN. STAT. § 80B.01 (1986).
36. Id. § 80B.03 subd. 4a.
37. Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1984). The Minnesota law
was not facially unconstitutional under the commerce clause because it only applied when a
target company had a substantial number of Minnesota shareholders. The Commissioner of
Commerce was authorized to suspend a tender offer if the registration materials failed to apprise
local investors fairly of the required information. The court found the law not unduly burden-
some to interstate commerce, and thus constitutional under the commerce clause. The court also
held the law was not in conflict with the Williams Act and so was facially constitutional under
the supremacy clause, except for provisions that authorized the Commissioner to require disclo-
sure beyond specified information. Id.
38. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1988).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Compare id. with N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986) (five year waiting pe-
riod). The constitutionality of the Delaware law already has been challenged by takeover bid-
ders. Wall St. J., Jan. 29, 1988, at 6, col. 2; Id., Feb. 3, 1988, at 10, col. 3.
42. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10.1211 (Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-1 (Burns
Supp. 1987).
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at least a majority of the disinterested shares to restore those voting
rights.4 3 As applied to domestic corporations with shareholders in that
state, this type of takeover law has been upheld as constitutional. In
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,44 the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Indiana Control Shares Acquisition Act (Indi-
ana Act). The Indiana Act applies to Indiana corporations that have a
specified number of shareholders residing in Indiana and have opted
for the Act's protection. 45 Under the Indiana Act, an acquirer of con-
trol shares gains voting rights only to the extent granted by a majority
of all pre-existing disinterested shareholders. 46
Dynamics Corporation of America (Dynamics) announced a tender
offer for an amount of shares of CTS Corporation (CTS) that sub-
jected the transaction to the Indiana Act. CTS then opted for the In-
diana Act's protection whereupon Dynamics, which had already filed
suit in federal district court alleging federal securities law violations by
CTS, 47 amended its complaint to challenge the Indiana Act's validity
under the commerce clause and the supremacy clause. The district
court granted Dynamics' motion for declaratory relief, ruling that the
Williams Act preempted the Indiana Act. The district court also later
held that the Indiana Act violated the commerce clause.48 The Seventh
Circuit affirmed the district court, 49 but the United States Supreme
Court reversed, holding the Indiana Act valid under both the suprem-
acy and commerce clauses.5 0 The Florida Act is substantially identical
to the Indiana Act. 5 1
The Act is not the first Florida law regarding takeovers; the Florida
Investor Protection Act (FIPA) was effective from October 1, 1977
until its repeal in 1979.52 In general, FIPA required a tender offer for
any equity security of a Florida corporation or a foreign corporation
that had its principal place of business in Florida to be accompanied
by the filing of an information statement with both the Florida Divi-
43. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10.1211 (Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-1 (Burns
Supp. 1987).
44. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
45. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-17-3(b), 23-1-42-4(a) (Burns Supp. 1988); CTS Corp., 107 S.
Ct. at 1641.
46. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-9 (Burns Supp. 1988); CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1641.
47. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1642.
48. Id.
49. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct.
1637 (1987).
50. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1648, 1652.
51. Compare FLA. STAT. § 607.109(1)-(11) (1987) with IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-1 (Burns
Supp. 1988).
52. Ch. 77-441, §§ 1-8, 1977 Fla. Laws 1804-08 (repealed 1979).
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sion of Securities (the Division) and the target corporation's registered
agent in Florida." The information statement contained more infor-
mation than that required under the Williams Act.54 FIPA did not re-
quire administrative clearance or advance notice to the target
corporation, and was simply a disclosure law. FIPA offered only
slightly more protection to investors and Florida corporations than
the Williams Act already provided and did very little to eliminate the
surprise of an attempt to take over a Florida corporation. 55 The legis-
lature repealed FIPA in 1979, probably in response to the number of
takeover laws that had been held unconstitutional.5 6 The effect and
scope of the new Florida Act are different from FIPA.
II. SUMMARY OF THE ACT
In general, the Florida Act protects issuing public corporations
from hostile takeovers by denying voting rights to control shares un-
less the reinstatement of those rights is approved by the shareholders
of the corporation.5 7 The Act does not directly affect the acquisition
of shares, but rather governs only the voting rights attendant to con-
trol shares.58 Other shares of the same corporation owned or acquired
by the same person are not affected by the Act.59 Essentially, the Act
is a statutory poison pill. 6° The regulatory effect of a similar act on
tender offers has been aptly described:
No rational tender offeror will purchase shares without knowing
whether they will include voting rights. To do so would be like
buying a car before knowing whether it had an engine. Nor would
any rational tender offeror buy shares lacking voting rights, leaving
it unable to protect its investment. To do so would be like buying a
house with no roof. By detaching the voting rights from the shares
that are to be transferred in interstate tender offers, the [Act]
necessarily regulates those tender offers. 61
53. FLA. STAT. §§ 517.351, .355 (1977).
54. Compare id.. § 517.355(2) with 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(1)(A)-(E), 78n(d)(l) (1982).
55. FIPA did provide civil liability for damages or rescission against any offeror, partici-
pant, or aider and abettor who violated its provisions. FLA. STAT. § 517.359 (1977). The Division
also had authority to enforce compliance or enjoin violations. Id. § 517.361.
56. For a full discussion of FIPA see Louv, Developments in Florida Corporate Law and
Securities Regulation, 32 U. MIAso L. REV. 931 (1978).
57. FLA. STAT. § 607.109(l)-(9) (1987).
58. Id. § 607.109(5). Compare id. with Ouio REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.83.1 (Anderson Supp.
1986) (acquisition itself hampered).
59. See FLA. STAT. § 607.109(1) (1987).
60. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. McAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986); Moran v. Household Int'l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
61. Brief for Appellee at 10, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987)
(Nos. 86-71 & 86-97) (describing Indiana provision).
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A. Regulated Corporations
The Act applies to issuing public corporations, which include both
Florida corporations and foreign corporations that have been author-
ized by the Florida Department of State to transact business in Florida
and that have statutorily prescribed relationships to Florida.62 An issu-
ing public corporation is one that has (a) 100 or more shareholders;
(b) its principal place of business, its principal office, or substantial
assets within Florida; and (c) either (i) more than 10%o of its share-
holders residing in Florida, (ii) more than 10% of its outstanding and
issued shares owned by Florida residents, or (iii) 1,000 shareholders
residing in Florida. 63 A foreign corporation-one incorporated in a ju-
risdiction other than Florida-is subject to the Act if it is an issuing
public corporation and also has the following relationships with Flor-
ida: (a) it has more than 500 Florida residents as employees; (b) it has
an annual gross payroll for Florida residents of more than $5 million;
and (c) the jurisdiction of its incorporation does not have any law
"expressly inconsistent" with the Act. 64
The Act does not address what constitutes "substantial assets
within Florida," 65 or how that determination should be made with re-
gard to transient assets such as airplanes, vessels, and rolling stock.
Presumably, the meaning of that phrase differs from the meaning of
the phrase "all or substantially all the assets," which is used in con-
nection with the sale or exchange of assets. 6 Moreover, that phrase is
not used anywhere else in the Florida General Corporation Act. 67
Shares owned of record by banks, brokers, and nominees are disre-
garded for the purpose of calculating whether a corporation satisfies
the above jurisdictional criteria relating to its shareholders. 6 Banks,
brokers, and nominees commonly hold large amounts of stock in
"street name" or "nominee name" for the benefit of individual and
institutional investors. For example, shares held in an investment ac-
count for an individual investor generally are owned of record by the
investment firm, but are held by that firm for the benefit of the indi-
62. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.004(5), .109(4), .110(2) (1987).
63. Id. § 607.109(4)(a).
64. Id. § 607.110(2)-(3). See supra note 9 and accompanying text. The address of a share-
holder appearing in the corporation's records is presumed to be the shareholder's residence. FLA.
STAT. § 607.109(4)(b) (1987).
65. FLA. STAT. § 607.109(4)(a) (1987).
66. Id. § 607.241. See Schwadel v. Uchitel, 455 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
67. FLA. STAT. ch. 607 (1987).
68. Id. § 607.109(4)(c).
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vidual investor. Each individual is deemed the "beneficial owner" of
such shares. 6
9
The exclusion of shares owned beneficially by Florida investors in
determining whether the Act applies is inconsistent with one of its
purposes, which is to protect Florida shareholders in hostile takeov-
ers. 70 The Act should protect Florida beneficial owners just as it pro-
tects those who are the record owners of shares. Possibly, the
distinction between record and beneficial owners was made because of
the difficulty of determining the names and addresses of beneficial
owners, but that difficulty has been overcome in other important
areas.71
The Act does not prescribe a calculation date for making the deter-
minations described above. The calculation date could be the date
when the tender offer is announced, the shares are tendered, the
shares are purchased, the tender offer is completed, the acquiring per-
son's statement is filed, or some other date set by management in its
discretion. If a tender offer is involved, the commencement- date for
that transaction would seem appropriate.7 2 The date when a control-
share acquisition occurs would be appropriate in other instances. For
example, if an acquirer begins to purchase a target company's stock in
open-market trades that will result in a control-share acquisition, the
date of the first purchase should be the calculation date, assuming all
the shares were acquired in the same transaction. 73 Compounding the
uncertainty over the calculation date are questions of whether the Act
becomes inapplicable if a corporation's characteristics cease to satisfy
the Act's jurisdictional test during the course of a control-share acqui-
sition, and whether an acquiring person who is not an existing share-
holder may obtain any of the information necessary to make the
determinations inherent in that test before making a control-share ac-
quisition.
Presumably the Act would remain applicable if one of the qualify-
ing characteristics changes during the course of a control-share acqui-
sition. The Act should provide for a specific date upon which the
applicability of the Act will be determined and, once applicable, all
the participants (bidders, shareholders, and management) should be
bound to that determination during the term of a control-share acqui-
sition. The Act should enable an acquiring person to determine in ad-
69. For a general discussion of shares held in street name, see H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES
AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 13.07 (rev. ed. 1987).
70. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
71. See 17 C.F.R. § 14b-l (1987).
72. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2 (1987).
73. FLA. STAT. § 607.109(2)(b) (1987).
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vance whether it would apply to the acquiring person's proposed
transaction so as not to foreclose preplanning. Moreover, because the
corporation has access to the information necessary to make this de-
termination, it should have the burden of proving the Act is applica-
ble unless the Act is amended to require the corporation to provide
the acquiring person with the requisite information before the initia-
tion of a control-share acquisition.14
B. Regulated Securities
The Act regulates the acquisition of the voting power-true owner-
ship-of control shares. 75 The statute defines the term "control
shares" to mean shares having voting power that, when added to all
other shares the acquirer owns or has the power to vote, would give
the acquirer (directly, indirectly, alone, or as part of a group) any of
the following ranges of total voting power with respect to the election
of a corporation's directors: (1) at least one-fifth, but less than one-
third; (2) at least one-third, but less than a majority; or (3) a majority
or more. 76 The Act's definition of control shares leaves unclear
whether control shares are all the shares the person acquires in the
control-share acquisition or only those shares that exceed the thresh-
old levels of voting power.77 For example, if a person owning 4°76 of a
corporation's issued and outstanding shares purchases another 19076,
the Act can be interpreted to either disfranchise all the shares consti-
tuting the 19% acquired in that control-share acquisition, or only the
4076 that causes the acquirer's total voting power to equal or exceed
the 20% threshold.
The definition of control shares also leaves unclear whether it ap-
plies to a separate acquisition of shares that results in a person's total
voting power remaining within the same range; for example, a rise
from 21% to 260%0. The Act should not be interpreted to disfranchise
stock acquisitions that result in a person's voting power remaining
within the same voting range, because then the separate voting power
levels of 331/307o and 50076 would be unnecessary, as any stock acquisi-
tion that raises a person's voting power over the 20076 threshold would
74. Existing shareholders have the right to examine the corporation's list of shareholders
for a proper purpose. Id. § 607.157 (1987). The issue is whether an impending tender offer or
control-share acquisition is a proper purpose. See Florida Tel. Corp. v. State ex rel. Peninsula
Tel. Co., 111 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959). An acquiring person currently has limited rights
to a shareholder list if a tender offer is involved, but the list is not made available until the
tender offer commences. 17 C.F.R. § 14d-5 (1987).
75. FLA. STAT. § 607.109(2) (1987).
76. Id. § 607.109(1).
77. At least one commentator has noted this uncertainty. Ames, supra note 5, at 59.
19881
114 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:103
be disfranchised. Such an interpretation would require continuous
compliance with the Act by a person who already has consummated a
control-share acquisition and received voting power for those shares.
The drafters of the Act probably did not intend this result.
C. Regulated Persons
The Act applies to stock acquisitions that enable a "person," alone
or as part of a "group," to exercise or direct the exercise of voting
power of control shares. 78 The Act does not define what constitutes a
group or under what circumstances a person will be a member of a
group. The concept of a group differs from beneficial ownership and
denotes owners acting in concert, whether they own the shares directly
or beneficially. 79 When two or more persons act as a group for the
purpose of holding, acquiring, or disposing of securities registered un-
der the Exchange Act, they must aggregate their securities holdings to
determine if they are subject to the reporting requirements of the Wil-
liams Act. 0 Courts applying the Williams Act generally have found a
group to exist when several shareholders agree to pool their interests
in corporate securities and to act in concert to carry out a plan to
obtain control of a corporation.81 Any time shareholders agree to act
in concert, they arguably constitute a group for purposes of the Act.
Nevertheless, Florida courts have yet to decide this issue.82
Assuming that several shareholders who agree to act in concert con-
stitute a group, the Act does not address whether the mere formation
of a group that collectively owns at the time of its association more
than one of the threshold levels of voting power constitutes a control-
share acquisition. 3 For example, assume that shareholders A, B, and
C each own 7% of the outstanding voting stock of a corporation. If
78. FLA. STAT. § 607.109(1) (1987).
79. In certain instances, the formation of a group results in each member of the group
receiving the beneficial ownership of the shares owned by the other members of the group, de-
pending on the rights acquired by group members. Although interrelated, these concepts are
treated differently in this Article because the Act does not expressly embrace the beneficial own-
ership concept. See infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
80. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(3), 78n(d)(2) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5 (1987).
81. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972);
Trans World Corp. v. Odyssey Partners, 561 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Bath Indus. v.
Blot, 305 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
82. Florida courts probably will find a group to exist whenever a voting trust, shareholders'
agreement, or other agreement exists regarding the voting of shares. See FLA. STAT. §§ 607.104,
.107 (1987).
83. See 17 C.F.R. 13d-5(b)(1) (1987) (group deemed to have acquired beneficial ownership
of all shares held by the group on the date of the agreement for purposes of sections 13(d) and
(g) of the Exchange Act).
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A, B, and C enter into a shareholders' agreement and agree to vote
their shares in accordance with the decision of the majority, a control-
share acquisition has occurred on the date of the agreement because
that group has obtained the power to direct the exercise of more than
2007o of the voting power of the corporation. This result is more likely
if the concept of beneficial ownership is incorporated into the Act's
definition of ownership. Further, if the Act applies to the group in the
preceding example, the members of the group might not have voting
rights for their shares even on matters unrelated to the purpose of the
group. For example, if the group was formed to vote in unison on a
pending merger, the shareholders might be prohibited from voting
separately in an election of directors.
The mere formation of a group should not constitute a control-
share acquisition until enough shares are actually acquired by the
group or the group's members to raise the group's aggregate voting
power above the next statutory level. Using the above example, a con-
trol-share acquisition should not occur until the group or a member of
the group purchased shares subject to the group's voting agreement
that caused the group's collective voting power to exceed 331/3%. An
agreement between existing shareholders should not trigger the Act's
voting divestiture, as each shareholder in the group had voting rights
before the formation of the group, and shareholders should be free to
discuss pending corporate matters and to vote those shares to protect
their investment. A different interpretation would not further the
Act's purpose of protecting existing shareholders in hostile takeovers.
This assumes, however, that the initial purchases were not made pur-
suant to a plan to effect a control-share acquisition.1
4
The Act applies to "the acquisition, directly or indirectly, by any
person of ownership of, or the power to direct the exercise of voting
power with respect to, issued and outstanding control shares." 85 The
statutory language focuses on who controls the voting power of
shares, and subjects any person who, directly or indirectly, owns or
possesses the voting power of control shares to the Act's require-
ments. The Act does not address, however, what constitutes the own-
ership of voting stock or under what circumstances a person is deemed
to have the power to direct the voting of shares. Consequently, neither
the corporation, its legal counsel, nor the acquiring person will be able
to determine with any certainty, except in the most obvious cases,
whether sufficient ownership rights or control over the voting power
84. See infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
85. FLA. STAT. § 607.109(2)(a) (1987).
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of shares have been acquired to subject the transaction to the Act.
This uncertainty can only lead to litigation.
Some states have incorporated the concept of beneficial ownership
into their control-share acquisition lawsS6-probably in an attempt to
avoid the uncertainty described above. Under these laws, a beneficial
owner of control shares generally includes any person who, directly or
indirectly, through any agreement, arrangement, relationship, or un-
derstanding, has or shares the power to vote the shares, or has or
shares investment power over the shares, including the power to dis-
pose of, or direct the disposition of, the shares.17
The acquisition of voting power over shares pursuant to a proxy,
whether by a voting trust, shareholder's agreement, or other agree-
ment, arguably constitutes a control-share acquisition if one of the
threshold levels of voting power is exceeded. Other states that have
adopted a control-share acquisition law have dealt with the uncer-
tainty of whether a proxy is an acquisition. Those laws provide that a
person is not the beneficial owner of shares that that person has the
power to vote or to direct their voting pursuant to a revocable proxy
received in response to a proxy solicitation made in accordance with
the Exchange Act.8" Accordingly, the solicitation of proxies by the
management of a corporation would not result in a control-share ac-
quisition in those states adopting the concept of beneficial ownership.
The acquisition of voting power by proxy in other instances, though,
would be subject to those acts. Because the Florida Act does not use
the term "beneficial ownership," the solicitation of proxies by man-
agement might constitute a control-share acquisition. If so, the Act
would impede the conduct of annual meetings of shareholders because
86. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1201(10) (Supp. 1987); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 110D, § l(c)(1) (West Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. § 302A.011 subd. 38 (Supp. 1987); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-90(a)(3) (Supp. 1987).
87. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1201(5) (Supp. 1987); 1987 Mass. Acts HOD § 1(b);
MINN. STAT. § 302A.011 subd. 41 (Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-90(a)(1) (Supp. 1987). See
also 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-3(a), .16a-8(a) (1987); Insider Reporting and Trading, Exchange Act
Release No. 18,114, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,147 (Sept. 23, 1981); Statement Re: Beneficial Ownership,
Exchange Act Release No. 7793, 31 Fed. Reg. 1005 (Jan. 19, 1966); General Counsel's Opinion
Re: Sec. 16(a), Exchange Act Release No. 1965, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,970 (Dec. 21, 1938).
88. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1201(5)(b) (Supp. 1987). This section is typical of other
states' provisions in providing that:
A person is not deemed the beneficial owner of shares . . . which the person has the
power to vote . . . arising solely from a revocable proxy given in response to a proxy
solicitation . . . made in accordance with the applicable rules and regulations under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and is not then reportable under that act ....
Id. (footnote omitted). See also 1987 Mass. Acts 11D(l)(b) (holder of a revocable proxy is not a
beneficial owner).
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the proxies would be disfranchised. Although this result must be an
unintended consequence of the Act, the Act does require it.
Beneficial ownership includes the right to acquire shares through
the exercise of rights, options, warrants, or the conversion of convert-
ible securities. Again, the Act does not incorporate the concept of
beneficial ownership, but the ownership of rights, options, warrants,
or convertible securities might constitute the indirect ownership of the
underlying voting stock under the Act. If this is so, the shares of vot-
ing stock issuable upon exercise or conversion of those securities
should be considered issued and outstanding when calculating the per-
centages of voting power owned by that person. The drafters of the
Act, in avoiding the concept, possibly did not intend for it to apply to
shares that are only beneficially owned; but there does not seem to be
a difference between "indirect ownership" and "beneficial owner-
ship." Indirect ownership might mean that the determination of own-
ership or the control of voting power shares is more restrictive under
the Act than it is under federal securities law or under other states'
control-share acquisition laws. Unfortunately, the Act does not pro-
vide any guidance on the correct interpretation, and consequently, the
Act's application will be unpredictable.
D. Regulated Transactions
The Act applies to the acquisition of control shares. 9 Under the
Act, "shares acquired within [ninety] days or shares acquired pursu-
ant to a plan to make a control-share acquisition" are deemed to have
been acquired in the same acquisition. 9° The Act does not define what
constitutes a plan to make a control-share acquisition, although intent
to consummate a control-share acquisition by the acquiring person
presumably is necessary. 91
The Act does not indicate how the ninety-day period is to be ap-
plied, either. 92 It might apply to stock acquisitions made both ninety
days before and ninety days after the date of a control-share acquisi-
tion. This interpretation would cause all shares acquired within a 181-
day period to be control shares. Alternatively, the Act might be inter-
89. See FLA. STAT. § 607.109(2)(a) (1987). A control-share acquisition is "the acquisition,
directly or indirectly, by any person of ownership of, or the power to direct the exercise of
voting power with respect to, issued and outstanding control shares." Id.
90. FLA. STAT. § 607.109(2)(b) (1987).
91. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(11) (1982) (underwriter includes a person who purchases securities
from an issuer with a view to distributing those securities); SEC v. Pig'N Whistle Corp., 359 F.
Supp. 219 (N.D. I11. 1973) (shareholder with pre-existing plan to distribute securities is an under-
writer).
92. Ames has noted this issue. Ames, supra note 5, at 59.
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preted strictly to limit the time period to ninety days. Even under this
interpretation, however, the Act is unclear regarding whether the
ninety-day period precedes or follows the date of a control-share ac-
quisition. Finally, the ninety-day period might include the date of the
control-share acquisition plus either the preceding eighty-nine days or
succeeding eighty-nine days, or both. The resolution of this ambiguity
in the Act is crucial to determining the voting rights of shares pur-
chased by an acquiring person.
The date a person makes a binding and irrevocable commitment to
acquire shares should be the date used for determining the ninety-day
statutory period.93 Consequently, the delivery and payment dates for
the shares, which are subject to manipulation by the acquiring person
anyway, should be irrelevant. If the shares are acquired in a normal
brokerage transaction, the trade date, not the settlement date, should
be the date of acquisition for purposes of the Act. These issues are yet
to be settled by the courts, but the above recommendations would be
consistent with the approach taken by federal courts interpreting sec-
tion 16(b) of the Exchange Act. 94
Any person who becomes the owner or obtains the voting power of
control shares is deemed to have acquired them for purposes of the
Act, whether the acquisition is by purchase or otherwise. 95 The Act
even applies to control shares acquired pursuant to the exercise of pre-
emptive rights. In general, a preemptive right entitles an existing
shareholder to purchase new capital stock of a corporation in an
amount equal to the percentage of issued and outstanding stock that
the shareholder already owns. For example, a 20% shareholder exer-
cising preemptive rights would have the right to purchase 20% of the
additional capital stock to be issued by the corporation. Shareholders
of a Florida corporation no longer automatically have preemptive
rights to acquire unissued or treasury shares of a corporation, unless
these rights are expressly provided for in the corporation's articles of
incorporation .96
93. This would be consistent with the Exchange Act's definition of purchase which includes
a contract to purchase. Cf. Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1954) (date of purchase was
when a commitment to purchase was made, not three years later when payment was made).
94. See, e.g., Riseman v. Orion Research, Inc., 749 F.2d 915, 918-19 (1st Cir. 1984); Provi-
dent Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 506 F.2d 601, 606-07 (9th Cir. 1974), aff'd, 423 U.S. 232
(1976); Champion Home Builders Co. v. Jeffress, 940 F.2d 611, 615 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 986 (1974).
95. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5 (1987). The Act applies to the acquisition of control shares
whether the person purchases those shares in a privately negotiated sale or in an open-market
trade.
96. FLA. STAT. § 607.077(1) (1987). Shareholders of a Florida corporation that existed be-
fore January 1, 1976, however, still have preemptive rights unless the articles of incorporation
have been amended to terminate those rights. Id. § 607.077(2).
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A shareholder's exercise of preemptive rights normally would not
constitute a control-share acquisition because the relative ownership
percentages of each shareholder would remain constant. However, if
an exercising shareholder has a right of overallotment to purchase
shares not purchased by the other shareholders, the Act might apply.
This result is unwarranted because shareholders who have not elected
to exercise their preemptive rights implicitly have agreed to dilute their
ownership and control of the corporation. If a shareholder exercises
rights of overallotment, the other shareholders should not be able to
maintain their existing voting control percentage by abstaining from
exercising their preemptive rights and voting against reinstating the
voting rights of shares acquired by the other shareholders pursuant to
the exercise of preemptive rights.
The Act would also apply to control shares acquired directly from
the corporation or a wholly-owned subsidiary, whether by a public or
private offering. 97 This can lead to inadvertent control-share acquisi-
tions. For example, assume that a corporation is making an initial
public offering of 100,000 shares of its common stock. If an investor
subscribes to purchase 15,000 shares but only a total of 50,000 shares
are sold, the Act would disfranchise the purchased shares. And yet,
the investor cannot cancel the subscription and, therefore, will be de-
prived of the full benefit of the investment. This result does not pro-
tect other shareholders. Rather, it penalizes a significant investor who
wants to participate in the corporation. No large institutional investor
would take such a risk unless the corporation's bylaws and articles of
incorporation provide that the corporation has opted out of the act.9
Shares acquired pursuant to the exercise of any right, option, or
warrant, or pursuant to the conversion of convertible debt securities
or nonvoting convertible preferred stock are similarly subject to the
Act. 99 The effect of the exercise or conversion of those securities is the
same as a direct purchase of voting stock. Unless the concept of bene-
ficial ownership applies, acquisition of a mere right of conversion
should not trigger the Act because the owner will not have any voting
rights. Further, the Act should not apply to rights, options, warrants,
or convertible securities acquired before the effective date of the Act
97. Other states have exempted control-share acquisitions made directly from the corpora-
tion. E.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.015(4)(d) (Supp. 1987).
98. The disclosure of the potential effect of the Act presents a particularly interesting issue
under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended. Also, it is questionable whether securities without
voting rights would be approved for registration under Florida's Securities and Investor Protec-
tion Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 517.07, .081 (1987). See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 3E-700.001 (1987).
99. Missouri has exempted the conversion of debt securities into voting stock from the pro-
visions of its state law. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.015(4)(f) (Supp. 1987).
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but exercised or converted after that date. Otherwise, the holder of
those securities would not receive the benefit of the bargain. To sub-
ject the exercise or conversion of securities acquired before the effec-
tive date would be particularly harsh if the owner of those securities
could not exercise or convert those securities before the effective date
of the Act, or if the subsequent exercise or conversion were involun-
tary.
The Act applies to voting stock acquired pursuant to a recapitaliza-
tion of a corporation, even if the recapitalization is approved by a
majority of the shareholders entitled to vote on the matter.'0° For ex-
ample, assume that a corporation's shareholders approve a recapitali-
zation that creates two additional classes of stock, one class of voting
common stock and one class of nonvoting cumulative preferred stock.
The corporation then offers to exchange each share of its outstanding
voting stock for either one share of the new voting stock or two shares
of the nonvoting cumulative preferred stock. The election to receive
voting stock for voting stock might constitute a control-share acquisi-
tion and result in a forfeiture of voting rights for that stock. This
result would be inequitable because a majority of the existing share-
holders approved the recapitalization plan.
The Act applies as well to exchange offers between a corporation
and the shareholders of another corporation. In an exchange offer,
one corporation offers to exchange its stock for the stock of another
corporation. For example, corporation A offers to exchange one share
of its common stock for each share of common stock owned by cor-
poration B's shareholders. Applying the Act, corporation A might not
receive voting stock if the shares tendered pursuant to the exchange
offer exceed one of the Act's threshold levels of voting power; how-
ever, the shareholders of corporation B would receive voting stock if
none of them surpasses the Act's prescribed levels of voting power.
This result would also be inequitable.
If the percentage of a person's ownership of a corporation before
the Act's effective date is below one of the threshold levels of voting
power set forth in the Act, and the corporation repurchases sufficient
outstanding shares to raise that person's ownership percentage above
a threshold level, the Act is unclear whether the corporation's repur-
chase would constitute a control-share acquisition by the share-
holder. 01 For example, assume that a shareholder owns 19,000 shares
100. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.177, .181, .184 (1987).
101. The Act does not affect a corporation's voting rights in a repurchase of its own shares
because it would be unable to vote those shares anyway. Id. §§ 607.097(2), .204. Further, the
corporation would not have to comply with the disclosure provisions of the Act when repurchas-
ing shares because those procedures are elective and necessary only to obtain full voting rights.
See id. § 607.109(6).
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of a corporation that has 100,000 shares issued and outstanding. If
the corporation repurchases more than 5,000 shares from other share-
holders, the person's ownership percentage would increase from 19%
to above 20%. The Act should not apply to a person whose voting
power increases because of corporate stock repurchases, because if ap-
plicable, a corporation could disfranchise unpleasant but influential
shareholders by repurchasing stock. Similarly, the Act should not ap-
ply to spin-offs, split-offs, and reverse stock splits that increase a
shareholder's percentage of voting power. However, since not all cor-
porate actions take place without shareholder influence, the Act
should apply if an influential shareholder persuades the corporation
to repurchase its stock for the sole purpose of increasing that share-
holder's ownership percentage of voting stock.
Certain acquisitions, in addition to those consummated before the
effective date of the Act, are exempt. 0 2 Thus, shares acquired by the
laws of descent and distribution and, presumably, shares transferred
pursuant to a will, are excluded.103 The Act does apply, however, to
other gratuitous transfers. For example, the transfer of control shares
to a trust is subject to the Act. °0 The rationale for the distinction be-
tween testamentary and inter vivos transfers is unclear, and whether it
furthers the stated purpose of the Act depends on the circumstances
surrounding the transfer. 0 5
The acquisition of control shares pursuant to the satisfaction of a
stock pledge agreement or the enforcement of a security interest cre-
ated in good faith, and not for the purpose of circumventing the Act,
does not constitute a control-share acquisition. 1°6 Presumably, the
subsequent sale (public, private, or judicial) of the control shares held
by the secured party would be subject to the Act and would thereby
diminish the value of the collateral if the secured party sells the con-
trol shares as a block, because the acquirer would not obtain voting
rights. 0 7 Accordingly, the Act might force a lending institution to re-
main an unwilling shareholder instead of a creditor, prevent a full re-
102. Id. § 607.109(2)(d). This probably saves the Act from being unconstitutional as an im-
pairment of contract. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.
103. FLA. STAT. § 607.109(2)(d)(3) (1987). See House Staff Analysis, supra note 6, at 4.
104. Other states have exempted these kinds of transfers. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
10-1201(10)(a) (Supp. 1987) (control-share acquisitions do not include inter vivos gifts); MINN.
STAT. § 302A.01 1 subd. 38(b) (Supp. 1987) (control-share acquisition does not include acquisi-
tion by donee pursuant to inter vivos gift).
105. The Act does not address whether a trustee or beneficiary is an indirect owner of shares
held in a trust. If the Act applied the concept of beneficial ownership, the answers would be
clearer. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
106. FLA. STAT. § 607.109(2)(d)(4) (1987).
107. See id. § 679.504.
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alization of the value of collateral, and preclude the sale of control
shares to a new group of shareholders that has the financial resources
to fund the ailing corporation. Further, if the Act prevents a debtor
from redeeming control shares from a secured party by characterizing
the redemption as a control-share acquisition, it would be an unfair
result since the shares were already owned by the debtor prior to the
default.
Shares acquired pursuant to a merger or consolidation are not sub-
ject to the Act if the corporation is a party to the agreement of merger
or consolidation. 0 8 Control shares acquired pursuant to any savings,
employee stock ownership, or other employee benefit plan of a corpo-
ration or its subsidiaries are not subject to the Act.' °9 Presumably, this
exemption permits management to establish an employee stock owner-
ship plan to effect a leveraged buy-out of the corporation.
The Act exempts acquisitions made by agents, brokers, fiduciaries,
and other persons who acquire record title to shares "in the ordinary
course of business for the benefit of others in good faith and not for
the purpose of circumventing" the Act."10 These persons have voting
power over only those shares to which they can exercise, or direct the
exercise of, votes without further instructions from others."' The Act
also exempts acquisitions by, or from, any person who previously has
been accorded voting rights under the Act, or any person "whose pre-
vious acquisition of shares" would have been subject to the Act but
for a transactional exemption provided by the Act."12
A person who acquires shares in an exempt transaction is not sub-
ject to the Act, regardless of that person's new total voting power per-
centage. For example, a person who inherits shares representing 25%
percent of the voting power of an issuing public corporation is not
subject to the Act." 3 In addition, that person's stock ownership may
be increased within the same statutory range of voting power, such as,
20% to 331/3%, without being subject to the Act. 114 However, if a
subsequent acquisition of shares elevates that person's total voting
108. Id. § 607.109(2)(d)(5).
109. Id. § 607.109(2)(d)(6).
110. Id. § 607.109(2)(c).
111. Id.
112. Id. § 607.109(2)(e). This exemption is conditioned on the acquisition being made "in
good faith and not for the purpose of circumventing [the Act]." Furthermore, the exemption
does not apply if "the acquisition entitles any person, directly or indirectly, alone or as part of a
group, to exercise or direct the exercise of the voting power of the corporation in the election of
directors in excess of the range of the voting power otherwise authorized." Id.
113. FLA. STAT. § 607.109(2)(d)(3) (1987).
114. Id. § 607.109(2)(e)(2).
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power to a higher statutory range, such as 331/3%Vo to 50%, the shares
acquired in that transaction would be subject to the Act."'
E. The Poison Pill
Control shares have the same voting rights they had before the con-
trol-share acquisition to the extent granted by the shareholders of the
corporation." 6 Whether shareholders can vote to grant control shares
lesser voting rights than they had before their acquisition is unclear."17
The shareholder resolution must be approved by disinterested share-
holders, and may have to be approved by all the shareholders. Under
the Act, "interested shares" are those owned by the following per-
sons: (1) the acquiring person or group; (2) any officer of the issuing
public corporation; and (3) any employee of the issuing public corpo-
ration who is also a director of it. l"" The Act does not set forth a
calculation date for determining if shares are interested or disinter-
ested. 119
If the date of the shareholder meeting at which the voting rights of
the control shares will be determined is selected as the calculation
date, the solicitation of proxies for that meeting either by manage-
ment or the acquiring person would be futile if a revocable proxy con-
stitutes the power to direct the voting of shares for purposes of the
Act.'20 In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, the Court as-
sumed that the determination of interested shares under a similar stat-
ute would be made as of the record date. 121 The date when the
acquiring person's statement is filed, however, would be subject to
less manipulation by management. The voting rights of control shares
are determined at the first special or annual meeting of shareholders
following the date when they were acquired, unless the acquirer re-
quests an earlier determination, undertakes to pay the corporation's
expenses for the meeting, and files an acquiring person statement
(APS). 22 The directors of the corporation have ten days to call a spe-
115. Id. § 607.109(2)(e).
116. Id. § 607.109(9)(a).
117. Subsection (5) provides that control shares "have only such voting rights as are con-
ferred by subsection (9)." Id. § 607.109(5) (emphasis added). This implies that less than full
voting rights can be conferred.
118. Id. §607.109(3).
119. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
120. The solicitation of proxies might constitute a control-share acquisition. Other states
have avoided this interpretative issue. See supra text accompanying notes 88-89.
121. 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1641 n.2 (1987) (Indiana Statute).
122. FLA. STAT. § 607.109(7) (1987). The acquiring person may file an APS at the corpora-
tion's principal office. The APS must set forth prescribed information, including the identity of
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cial meeting of shareholders, to be held within fifty days, to determine
the voting rights of the control shares." 3 The acquirer may request
that the special meeting be held not sooner than thirty days after the
issuing public corporation's receipt of the APS. 24
The Act does not provide any consequences for a corporation's fail-
ure to comply with its provisions. Presumably, an acquirer who is an
existing shareholder would have the right to force the corporation to
comply with the Act. If the acquiring person is not an existing share-
holder, the Act possibly cannot be enforced against the corporation,
except by the other shareholders.
The Act also is unclear as to whether, in the absence of a funda-
mental corporate change, a second vote to approve the reinstatement
of voting rights is required of all shareholders or of all shareholders in
each class. 25 The Court did not express an opinion on an identical
provision under the Indiana Act. 26 The SEC and Dynamics Corpora-
tion argued that the Indiana Act required a vote by all shareholders of
record in addition to a vote by all disinterested shareholders of each
class of stock. The SEC specifically argued that a separate vote must
be taken by all shareholders and that the vote must be taken by sepa-
rate groups if the acquisition would result in one of the statutorily
enumerated transactions. Dynamics argued that a second vote was re-
quired only if the acquisition would result in a fundamental corporate
the acquiring person or persons; the number of shares owned; the range of voting power under
which the control share acquisition would fall; and the terms of the proposed acquisition. Id. §
607.109(6). Some of this information is similar to that required under the Williams Act. See
supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
123. FLA. STAT. § 607.109(7)(a), (b) (1987). The acquiring person may agree to a different
date. Id. § 607.109(7)(b). If a special meeting is requested, the issuing public corporation must
give notice of the meeting "as promptly as reasonably practicable" to all shareholders of record
as of the record date for the meeting, regardless of whether they are entitled to vote at the
meeting. The notice of an annual or special meeting at which control share voting rights will be
considered must be accompanied by both a copy of the APS received by the corporation and a
statement of the position or recommendation of the corporation's board of directors regarding
authorizing voting rights for the control shares. Id. § 607.109(8).
124. FLA. STAT. § 607.109(7)(c) (1987).
125. Id. § 607.109(9)(b)(1). The Act provides that the resolution must be approved by:
1. Each class or series entitled to vote separately on the proposal by a majority of all
the votes entitled to be cast by the class or series, with the holders of the outstanding
shares of a class or series being entitled to vote as a separate class if the proposed
control-share acquisition would, if fully carried out, result in any of the changes de-
scribed in s. 607.184; and
2. Each class or series entitled to vote separately on the proposal by a majority of all
the votes entitled to be cast by that group, excluding all interested shares.
Id. § 607.109(9)(b).
126. See CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1641-42 n.3. The CTS lower courts decided two separate
votes were required. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 637 F. Supp. 389, 398 (N.D. Ill.
1986), aff'd., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir.), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
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change. The Court did not interpret that provision, and therefore, be-
cause of its similarity to the Indiana Act, the Act's voting require-
ments remain unclear.
A class or series of voting stock is entitled to vote separately on the
proposal to give voting rights to control shares if the acquisition in-
volves an amendment to the corporation's articles of incorporation
that would require class voting under section 607.184 of the Florida
General Corporation Act. z7 The Act probably requires two separate
votes: one by a majority of all shareholders or by class or series if the
acquisition would result in an organic corporate change, and a second
by a majority of all disinterested shareholders.
F. Redemption of Control Shares
The Act provides that, unless an APS has been filed, the corpora-
tion may redeem control shares for their "fair value" at any time dur-
ing the period ending sixty days after the last day of their
acquisition. 28 The corporation may redeem those control shares only
if permitted by its bylaws or articles of incorporation before the con-
trol-share acquisition. The Act does not specifically address whether
the corporation may redeem shares that are given limited or restricted
voting rights. A corporation can probably redeem those shares since
the Act authorizes redemption rights if the control shares are not
given full voting rights. The status of control shares that are neither
accorded full voting rights nor redeemed by the corporation is still
uncertain, however. If all voting rights are denied, it is unclear
whether the holders of control shares will be allowed to vote on cer-
tain matters despite that denial. 29 The corporation may redeem con-
trol shares at any time after the denial of voting rights by the
shareholders. 130
The Act does not provide a method for restoring voting rights to
shares after they have been resold or disfranchised by the Act. This
suggests that once the voting rights of the control shares are denied,
those rights are terminated forever. Under this interpretation, a per-
son with nonvoting control shares would be unable to resell them. In
addition, this interpretation increases the relative voting power of the
other shareholders without further cost or expense to them, legisla-
tively creates a separate class of securities, and possibly creates a for-
feiture or an impermissible restraint on the alienation of property.
127. FLA. STAT. § 607.184(1) (1987).
128. Id. § 607.109(10)(a).
129. Id. § 607.184.
130. Id. § 607.109(10)(b).
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To avoid such results, the voting rights taint attendant to control
shares should evaporate when those shares are transferred to a person
in whose hands they are not control shares.' 3 ' The policy behind the
Act will be fully served if purchasers of limited amounts of control
shares do not inherit any voting rights restrictions attributable to them
in the hands of the seller.
G. Dissenters' Rights
If a person acquires control shares representing a majority of the
total voting power of an issuing public corporation and those control
shares are accorded full voting rights, all the shareholders have dis-
senters' rights to be paid the fair value of their shares.' 32 The Act's
language impliedly precludes dissenters' rights for shares granted lim-
ited or restricted rights. The Act provides dissenters' rights to all
shareholders of the corporation,'33 without regard to whether a share-
holder dissents or votes in favor of giving the control shares full vot-
ing rights. This result is contrary to the procedures applicable to other
dissenters' rights transactions, such as mergers, liquidations, or sales
of all or substantially all the assets of a corporation. Usually, a share-
holder who votes for the transaction, or who fails to affirmatively ob-
ject to the transaction, is not entitled to exercise any dissenters'
rights. 13 4
Moreover, the Act expressly requires that the fair value payable to
dissenters for their shares must not be less than the highest price per
share paid for any of the control shares.' This prevents an acquirer
from offering a premium price to obtain a controlling block of stock
and then offering a lower price for the remaining stock. Thus, a par-
tial tender offer for shares of an issuing public corporation is con-
verted by the Act into a total tender offer. Whatever the merit of this
objective, the Act allows a disinterested, minority shareholder to vote
in favor of giving control shares full voting rights just so the share-
holder may exercise dissenters' rights.'3 6 Such a result seems incongru-
ous and contrary to the commonly recognized purpose of dissenters'
rights. And yet the Act still permits a delayed, limited, two-tier price
offer in the event control shares happen to be purchased for less than
131. Id. § 607.109(2)(e).
132. Id. §§ 607.109(11), .244, .247.
133. Id. § 607.109(11). Interpreting the Act literally, even the acquiring person is entitled to
dissenters' rights, although this surely was not intended, and it probably will not result.
134. Id. § 607.247(1).
135. Id. § 607.109(11)(c).
136. Usually, the highest price paid for any of the control shares would be higher than the
current market price of the stock.
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non-control shares, which result is contrary to the purpose of the Act.
Finally, the Act's provision for dissenters' rights seemingly does not
incorporate the exclusions applicable to all other transactions for
which shareholders are accorded dissenters' rights under Florida law.
Specifically, the Act disregards the exclusions for corporations that
have 2,000 or more shareholders and for holders of shares that are
registered on a national securities exchange. 17 These exclusions from
dissenters' rights are traditionally premised on the theory that dissent-
ers may liquidate their ownership interests in stock through the public
market.
H. Opting Out and Other Elections
The Act expressly authorizes a corporation to amend its bylaws or
articles of incorporation to: (i) exempt future acquisitions of its shares
from the Act, in which case the corporation would not receive the
benefit of the law's takeover deterrence; (ii) deny dissenters' rights to
its shareholders with respect to the award of full voting rights to con-
trol shares;and (iii) give it redemption power over control shares.138 If
its bylaws or articles of incorporation so provide, an issuing public
corporation may redeem control shares for which an APS has not
been filed for fair value at any time during the sixty day period fol-
lowing the date of the last acquisition of control shares. 139
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ACT
The validity of control-share acquisition laws uniformly has been
assailed on constitutional grounds, and, until CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of America,140 these attacks had been successful' 4' under both
137. FLA. STAT. § 607.244(3)(b) (1987).
138. Id. § 607.109(5), (10), (ll)(a).
139. Id. § 607.109(10). "Fair value" for redemption apparently does not mean the same
thing as it does for dissenters' rights under subsection (11), which limits its definition to that
subsection. Id. § 607.109(1l)(c).
140. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987) (holding the Indiana Act valid under commerce clause and su-
premacy clause).
141. See, e.g., Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986) (Ohio act
violated commerce clause and supremacy clause), vacated and remanded sub nom. Ohio v. Fleet
Aerospace Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1949 (1987); Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829
(D. Minn. 1986), vacated in part on other grounds, 811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987) (Minnesota act
violated commerce clause and supremacy clause); Terry v. Yamashita, 643 F. Supp. 161 (D.
Haw. 1986) (Hawaii act violated commerce clause); APL Ltd. Partnership v. Van Dusen Air,
Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Minn. 1985) (Minnesota act violated commerce clause); Icahn v.
Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (Missouri act violated commerce clause and suprem-
acy clause; statute also alleged to violate contract clause, full faith and credit clause, and the
fourteenth amendment rights to freedom of contract and alienation of property). See also Edgar
1988)
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the commerce clause 142 and the supremacy clause. 143 The discussion
that follows addresses the issues raised by the Act and similar control-
share acquisition laws with regard to these constitutional issues, as
well as whether the Act violates the full faith and credit clause or the
due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Further, the Act's application to foreign corporations calls for
an inquiry into the proper application of the "internal affairs doc-
trine" of conflicts of laws.
A. Supremacy Clause
The supremacy clause' 44 invalidates a state law that is superseded or
preempted by federal law. 45 A federal law will supersede state law if
Congress manifests an intent to do so "by so stating in express
terms."146 Absent express preemption, congressional intent to preempt
all state law regarding an entire subject will be inferred if the federal
interest in the subject is dominant or the scheme of federal regulation
is sufficiently pervasive to indicate that Congress intended to occupy
that subject of regulation. 147 A state law is void to the extent that it
conflicts with federal law. 148 A conflict between state and federal law
exists if "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a phys-
ical impossibility"'' 49 or if the state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."15°
v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (Illinois act violated commerce clause and supremacy
clause); Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978) (Idaho act violated
commerce clause and supremacy clause), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W.
United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
142. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
143. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
144. "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land... , any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis
added).
145. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), Hillsborough County v. Automated
Medical Labs., 471 U.S. 707 (1985); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
146. Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 108 S. Ct. 1145, 1150 (1988); Automated Medi-
cal Labs., 471 U.S. at 713; Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
147. Schneidewind, 108 S. Ct. at 1150; Automated Medical Labs., 471 U.S. at 713; Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52
(1941).
148. Automated Medical Labs., 471 U.S. at 713; Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624,631
(1982). See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1644 (1987).
149. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963), cited
with approval and quoted in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1644
(1987); MITE, 457 U.S. at 631; Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978).
150. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941), cited with approval and quoted in CTS
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With respect to the Act's validity under the supremacy clause, the
issue is whether it is preempted by the Williams Act. To the extent
that the Act applies to tender offers that result in the acquisition of
control shares, both the Act and the Williams Act regulate the same
subject. Nevertheless, Congress has not explicitly superseded or pro-
hibited state regulation of tender offers. Section 28(a) of the Exchange
Act, which was not amended by the adoption of the Williams Act,
permits concurrent jurisdiction over securities transactions.'51 More-
over, compliance with both the Act and the Williams Act is entirely
possible. Therefore, the pertinent question is whether the Act is "an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives" of the Williams Act. 15 2
In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, the Court held that
the Indiana Act, upon which the Florida Act is modeled, was not pre-
empted by the Williams Act.' This precedent seemingly should sus-
tain the validity of the Act under the supremacy clause. Nevertheless,
two distinguishing features of the Act and the Court's shifting major-
ity on the preemption issue leave some room for doubt. The Court has
confronted on three occasions whether state laws regulating corporate
takeovers are preempted by the Williams Act. 5 4 In Leroy v. Great
Western United Corp., the Court disposed of the case on a venue
ground, thus it never considered the preemption issue.' 55 In a dissent-
ing opinion, however, Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, opposed the majority's decision to obviate the preemption
issue and stated their view that "the very enactment and existence of
the Williams Act pre-empts and invalidates all conflicting state efforts
to regulate cash tender offers."'15 6
In Edgar v. MITE Corp., the Court addressed the preemption issue
with respect to the Illinois Act. 57 Although five Justices agreed that
the Illinois Act violated the commerce clause, the Court was unable to
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1644 (1987); MITE, 457 U.S. at 632. Accord
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S.
519, 526 (1977); DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 363 (1976).
151. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982). "Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the
securities commission (or any agency or officer performing like functions) of any State over any
security or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this chapter or the
rules and regulations thereunder." Id.
152. Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.
153. 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1648 (1987).
154. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1637; Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); Leroy v.
Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
155. 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979).
156. Id. at 190 (White, J., dissenting).
157. 457 U.S. 624 (1982). See supra notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
19881
130 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:103
agree on the preemption issue. Justice White expressed the opinion of
a plurality of the Court that the Illinois Act was unconstitutional un-
der the supremacy clause. 58 Justices Brennan and Marshall, who
would have held that the Idaho takeover law in Great Western was
preempted by the supremacy clause, dissented in MITE on the ground
that the case was moot. 59 The plurality in MITE concluded that the
Illinois Act frustrated the objectives of the Williams Act by upsetting
"the careful balance struck by Congress" between the interests of
tender offerors and target companies.' 6° A major objective of the Wil-
liams Act was neutrality-to "avoid favoring either management or
the takeover bidder.' 6'
The plurality pointed to three provisions of the Illinois Act that
frustrated the neutrality objective of the Williams Act: first, the provi-
sion for a mandatory twenty-day waiting period after filing the tender
offeror registration with the Secretary of State; second, the provision
for a hearing by the Secretary of State; and third, the provision allow-
ing the Secretary of State to determine the substantive fairness of a
tender offer. 162 The first two provisions were found objectionable be-
cause they interjected too much delay into the tender offer process-
furnishing incumbent "management with a powerful tool to combat
tender offers." 63 The twenty-day precommencement notification re-
158. MITE, 457 U.S. at 634.
159. Id. at 655. Presumably, if Justices Brennan and Marshall had addressed the merits of
the case, they would have joined with the plurality to create a majority opinion holding that the
Illinois Act was preempted by the supremacy clause. The Illinois Act required any tender offer
for shares of a "target company" to be registered with the Secretary of State of Illinois. See
supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. A tender offer registration became effective 20 days
after it was filed, unless the Secretary of State called a hearing to adjudicate the substantive
fairness of the offer. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, para. 137.57.E (Supp. 1980). Such a hearing
could be called either if the Secretary believed it was necessary to protect the shareholders of the
target company or if it was requested by a majority of the target company'z outside directors or
Illinois shareholders owning 10% of the class of securities subject to the tender offer. Id. para.
137.57.A.
160. 457 U.S. at 634.
161. Id. at 633. The legislative history of the Williams Act expounds the economic utility of
takeover bids and evidences concern that the Williams Act not discourage takeover bids.
"[T]akeover bids should not be discouraged because they serve a useful purpose in providing a
check on entrenched but inefficient management." S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4
(1967), quoted in MITE, 457 U.S. 624, 633 (1982) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]. "We have taken
extreme care to avoid tipping the scales either in favor of management or in favor of the person
making the takeover bids." 113 CoNG. REc. 24,664 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams, sponsor
of Williams Act).
162. MITE, 457 U.S. at 634-40.
163. Id. at 635. Delay is a crucial weapon in defending a takeover:
[DIelays will give the target firm plenty of time to defeat the offer, by abolishing
cumulative voting, arranging a speedy defensive merger, quickly incorporating in a
State with [sic] antitakeover statute, or negotiating costly lifetime employment con-
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quirement also favored management by allowing it to disseminate its
views on the forthcoming tender offer before the bidder could publish
its offer.' 64 In addition, the provision for the Secretary of State to
hold a hearing on the proposed tender offer not only created an op-
portunity for indefinite delay, but also favored management over the
tender offeror by requiring a hearing at the request of either a major-
ity of the target company's outside directors or its Illinois sharehold-
ers owning ten percent of the class of securities subject to the tender
offer. 65 Allowing the Secretary of State to determine the substantive
fairness of a tender offer was held to conflict with a fundamental pur-
pose of the Williams Act-investor autonomy. 166
In CTS Corp., the Court held that the Indiana Act was not pre-
empted by the supremacy clause,' 67 even considering "the broad inter-
pretation of the Williams Act articulated by Justice White in
MITE."'' 61 The Court distinguished MITE by pointing out that none
of the three objectionable provisions of the Illinois Act were present
in the Indiana Act. 169 The Court limited the general rule of neutrality
enunciated in MITE by providing that a state cannot enact a takeover
statute that operates "to favor management against offerors, to the
detriment of shareholders.' '1 70 In the Court's view, the effect of the
Indiana Act was "to grant shareholders the power to deliberate collec-
tively about the merits of tender offers. This result is fully in accord
tracts .for incumbent management. And the longer the waiting period, the more the
target's stock may be bid up in the market, making the offer more costly-and less
successful.
122 CONG. REC. 30,877 (1976) (statement of Rep. Rodino describing consequences of delay in
discussing the relationship between Hart-Scott-Rodino Act and Williams Act). See also Lange-
voort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects, and Political Competency, 62 CORNELL
L. REv. 213, 238 (1977); Wachtell, Special Tender Offer Litigation Tactics, 32 Bus. LAW. 1433,
1437-42 (1977).
164. A 20-day advance notice requirement proposed by Senator Williams in 1965 in S. 2731
was considered by the SEC to be "unnecessary for the protection of security holders." 112
CONG. REC. 19,005 (1966). In 1967, Senator Williams proposed a five-day, confidential pre-
commencement filing requirement in S. 510, which was deleted from the bill before it was en-
acted as the Williams Act because "prior review was not necessary and in some cases might delay
the offer when time was of the essence." SENATE REPORT, supra note 161, at 4.
165. MITE, 457 U.S. at 637. The Court noted that management, as a group, is likely to own
10% of the outstanding equity securities of any particular target company.
166. Id. at 640. The Williams Act was designed to make the relevant facts known so share-
holders would have a fair opportunity to make their decision. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4 (1968); SENATE REPORT, supra note 161, at 3.
167. Curiously, Justices Brennan and Marshall joined the majority opinion, apparently
shunning their dissenting opinion in Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
168. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. v. Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1645 (1987).
169. Id. at 1646.
170. Id. at 1645 (emphasis added).
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with the purposes of the Williams Act." 7' Having interpreted the pur-
poses of the Williams Act in the foregoing manner, the Indiana Act's
compatibility with the Williams Act was a foregone conclusion.
The Court rejected as "illusory" any conflict with the Williams Act
based on the Indiana Act's imposition of a fifty-day minimum delay
before a shareholders' meeting could be held to determine the voting
rights of control shares purchased in a tender offer.' 72 The Court rea-
soned that the Indiana Act did not require a fifty-day delay before a
tender offeror could purchase tendered shares, and a tender offeror
could avoid any voting rights risk by making a tender offer contingent
on receiving voting rights.17 3 In any event, the Court did not view a
fifty-day delay as unreasonable, noting that MITE only denounced
"unreasonable delay.' ' 74 Further, the Court observed that "[tihe
longstanding prevalence of state regulation in this area suggests that,
if Congress had intended to pre-empt all state laws that delay the ac-
quisition of voting control following a tender offer, it would have said
so explicitly." '75
In CTS Corp., the Court noticeably abstained from mentioning any
of the numerous pro-management features of the Indiana Act, choos-
ing instead to beg the question whether it tilts the takeover contest in
favor of management and against the takeover bidder. The Indiana
Act favors management by allowing it to opt in and out of the act
merely by amending the corporation's bylaws, by imposing delay in
the tender offer process, by prohibiting a partial tender offer, by con-
verting every tender offer into a proxy contest that management may
finance with corporate funds and in which it enjoys preferential access
to shareholder lists and data, and by conditioning the attainment of
voting rights on a vote of a majority of all outstanding shares, so that
abstentions are effectively "no" votes against the tender offeror.
In MITE, three Justices concluded that the Illinois Act was pre-
empted by the Williams Act because it conflicted with the "neutral-
ity" objective of the Williams Act by favoring management over the
171. Id. at 1646 n.7 (emphasis added).
172. Id. at 1647. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that this
50-day delay mandated preemption under the supremacy clause because it was in direct conflict
with the shorter 20-business-day period the Williams Act condones as the minimum period a
tender offer must remain open. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 261 (7th
Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987). If the shareholder meeting to determine the voting
rights of the control shares is held more than 60 days after the commencement of a tender offer,
the tendering shareholders may withdraw their shares. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982).
173. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1647.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1648.
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takeover bidder. 176 In CTS Corp., the Court reformulated the preemp-
tion test to provide that only favoritism towards management "to the
detriment of shareholders" is preempted by the Williams Act. 177 This
reformulation, coupled with the Court's interpretation that one pur-
pose of the Williams Act is to grant shareholders the power to deliber-
ate collectively about the merits of tender offers, leads to the result
that reasonable delay and pro-management provisions pass constitu-
tional muster if they further that purpose. Since the Act is modeled
after the Indiana Act, it should withstand supremacy clause scrutiny
under the CTS Corp. rationale. Unlike the Indiana Act, however, the
Act applies to certain foreign corporations. At least one other control-
share acquisition act has been held invalid because it applied to for-
eign corporations. 178 Arguably, such acts interfere with the pervasive
scheme of federal regulation embodied by the Williams Act. Given the
changes in the composition of the Court since CTS Corp., the applica-
tion of the Act to foreign corporations might be enough to trigger
preemption by the Williams Act.
B. Internal Affairs Doctrine
The Act raises the issue whether a state may apply its corporate
laws to a foreign corporation. Traditionally, the internal affairs
doctrine 179 required the corporate laws of the state of incorporation to
be applied to issues involving corporate matters, such as the voting
rights of a shareholder. 180 The Court's application of the internal af-
fairs doctrine with respect to state takeover laws casts doubt on
whether the Act's purported application to foreign corporations will
be given effect.
Litigants have asserted the internal affairs doctrine as a defense for
sustaining state takeover laws from preemptory constitutional chal-
176. 457 U.S. at 633.
177. 107 S. Ct. at 1645-46.
178. Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, 1420 (W.D. Mo. 1985). See also Fleet Aerospace Co.
v. Holderman, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986) vacated and remanded sub nom. Ohio v. Fleet
Aerospace Co., 107 S. Ct. 1949 (1987) (vacated in light of CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987)).
179. The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws principle providing for the law of a
single jurisdiction to govern the internal affairs of a corporation:
The local law of the state of incorporation will be applied to determine such issues,
except in the unusual case where, with respect to the particular issue, some other state
has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties, in which event
the local law of the other state will be applied.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302(2) (1971). See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CON-
FLICTS OF LAW § 255 (3d ed. 1977); 2 J. BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 893-98 (1935).
180. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 304 (1971).
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lenges under the commerce and supremacy clauses.' 8' This argument
uses a conflict of laws rule as a substantive constitutional defense. In
MITE, the Illinois Secretary of State contended that the state's inter-
est in regulating the internal affairs of a local corporation was a suffi-
cient local interest to outweigh any indirect burden the Illinois Act
imposed on interstate commerce.'8 2 The Court characterized the doc-
trine as a conflict of laws principle and stated that it was "of little use
to the State in this context.' 1 83 The Court rejected as "somewhat in-
credible" the use of the doctrine to justify the Illinois Act's burden on
interstate commerce because "[t]ender offers . . . do not themselves
implicate the internal affairs of the target company," and because the
act regulated corporations that were not incorporated in Illinois.'8 4
The Court punctuated its point by stating that "Illinois has no interest
in regulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations."' 85
In CTS Corp., Indiana asserted the internal affairs doctrine to sus-
tain the validity of the Indiana Act against invalidation under the
commerce clause.' 86 This time the Court embraced the doctrine to dis-
pel the argument that the Indiana Act adversely affected interstate
commerce by subjecting stock acquisitions to inconsistent regulation
by different states:
So long as each State regulates voting rights only in the corporations
it has created, each corporation will be subject to the law of only one
state. No principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly
established than a State's authority to regulate domestic
corporations, including the authority to define the voting rights of
shareholders. 7
Also, the Court reasoned that the doctrine was important to interstate
capital markets because it provided uniformity and stability in the reg-
ulation of a corporation's affairs. "This beneficial free market system
depends at its core upon the fact that a corporation-except in the
rarest situations-is organized under, and governed by, the law of a
181. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1649 (1987); Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 625, 645 (1982).
182. 457 U.S. at 645.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 645 (citing Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1280 n.53 (5th Cir.
1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979)).
185. MITE, 457 U.S. at 645-46.
186. 107 S. Ct. at 1649.
187. Id. (emphasis added) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 304
(1971)).
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single jurisdiction, traditionally the corporate law of the State of its
incorporation." '188
The Court distinguished its opinion in MITE by noting that MITE
addressed:
[A]n Illinois law that applied as well to out-of-state corporations as
to in-state corporations. We agree that Indiana has no interest in
protecting nonresident shareholders of nonresident corporations. But
[the Indiana Act] applies only to corporations incorporated in
Indiana.... Moreover, unlike the Illinois statute invalidated in
MITE, the Indiana Act applies only to corporations that have a
substantial number of shareholders in Indiana. Thus, every
application of the Indiana Act will affect a substantial number of
Indiana residents, whom Indiana indisputably has an interest in
protecting.8 9
The Court's discussion of the internal affairs doctrine as rationale
for the validity of the Illinois Act under the commerce clause creates
ideological confusion. 190 Conflict of laws rules determine which of two
or more valid laws of different jurisdictions will govern a particular
issue. A conflict of laws rule should have nothing to do with deter-
mining whether a particular state's law is valid under the Constitu-
tion. Perhaps the Court implicitly was confirming that the same
rationale and public interests underlying the internal affairs doctrine
justify any burdens on interstate commerce arising from a state's reg-
ulation of the voting rights of a corporation incorporated under its
laws. The Court's articulation of the internal affairs doctrine in CTS
Corp. and MITE indicates that tender offers do not constitute "inter-
nal affairs of a corporation," but voting rights resulting from a tender
offer do. 191 The Court's opinions in CTS Corp., MITE, and earlier
cases seem to require that the law of the state of incorporation govern
the voting rights of corporate securities. 92 As the Court explained in
Shaffer v. Heitner with respect to the application of the internal af-
fairs doctrine to determine the law governing director liability, "[t]he
188. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1650 (emphasis added).
189. Id. at 1651-52 (citations omitted and emphasis added).
190. The CTS Corp. opinion has been criticized for effecting an "embedding of the state-of-
incorporation version of the internal affairs doctrine in the Constitution via the dormant Com-
merce Clause." Buxbaum, The Threatened Constitutionalization of the Internal Affairs Doc-
trine in Corporation Law, 75 CAnS. L. REv. 29, 54 (1987).
191. MITE, 457 U.S. at 645; CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1649.
192. See generally CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1637; MITE, 457 U.S. 624. See also Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66 (1975); Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935); Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288
U.S. 123 (1933) (shareholders implicitly agree to be governed by laws of state of incorporation).
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rationale for the general rule appears to be based more on the need
for a uniform and certain standard to govern the internal affairs of a
corporation than on the perceived interest of the State of incorpora-
tion."1 93 The Court previously has articulated this need for "unifor-
mity and certainty"1 94 and observed that "investors commit their
funds . . . on the understanding that . . . state law will govern the
internal affairs of the corporation." ,95 If the internal affairs doctrine
requires applying the law of the state of incorporation, the Act should
be unenforceable against a foreign corporation.
Some commentators suggest that the choice of law should not turn
on where the corporation is incorporated, but rather on which state
has a more significant relationship to the corporation and its share-
holders. 96 The advocates for a "most significant relationship" test ar-
gue that the modern theory of conflicts is that the law of the forum
state will apply if the forum state has a substantial interest in the par-
ties or the subject matter. Some authority exists for this position. 197
Other courts have recognized a "pseudo-foreign" corporation ex-
ception to the internal affairs doctrine that permits the enforcement of
mandatory policies and interests of a state having the only real con-
tacts with a corporation. 9 In Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v.
Johnson, the court applied the law of the forum state to a case involv-
ing the fiduciary obligations of corporate management and majority
193. 433 U.S. 186, 215 n.44 (1977).
194. Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947) (full faith and
credit clause requires application of laws of the state of incorporation). For a discussion of the
full faith and credit clause, see infra notes 220-30 and accompanying text.
195. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975). Accord Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,
479 (1977). See also Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123, 130 (1933); Broderick v. Ros-
ner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935) (New York law applied to shareholder assessments against New Jersey
residents).
196. E.g., Buxbaum, supra note 190, at 33. Contra Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice of
Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1.
197. Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 320 (1943) ("Nothing in the Constitu-
tion requires a state to nullify its own protective standards because an enterprise regulated has its
headquarters elsewhere.") (insurance regulation case); Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v.
Johnson, 268 F.2d 317 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (distinguishable because holding based on actiona-
ble fraud in transfer of stock, a transaction not involving internal affairs of a corporation), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959); Tankersley v. Albright, 374 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. I11. 1974) (Illinois
law applied to determine validity of voting trust for shares of a Delaware corporation that
owned the Chicago Tribune); Western Air Lines v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr.
719 (1961) (California cumulative voting requirement applied to corporation incorporated in
Delaware, even though Delaware law permitted unit voting). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (1971).
198. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 268 F.2d 317 (5th Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959). See Tankersley v. Albright, 374 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Ill. 1974)
(headquarters and principal place of business in Illinois). See generally Latty, Pseudo-Foreign
Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137 (1955).
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shareholders in purchasing stock from a minority shareholder. 199 All
the corporation's contacts, other than incorporation, were with the
forum state. This narrow exception to the internal affairs doctrine
would not sustain the Act's jurisdictional test for foreign corpora-
tions, because the Act could apply to a foreign corporation that has
more substantial ties to its state of incorporation than to Florida. Spe-
cifically, the Act would apply to a foreign corporation even if its prin-
cipal office and place of business were in another state, eighty-nine
percent of its shareholders were .residents of that other state, eighty-
nine percent of its shares were owned by residents of that other state,
and a majority of its employees were residents of that other state. 200
Other states have tried to extend their corporate laws to foreign cor-
porations. Since the turn of the century, New York has statutorily im-
posed a variety of its corporate laws on foreign corporations. 20 ,
Although the jurisdictional test has varied over the years, the courts
have allowed this application to foreign corporations. 202 In addition,
Section 2115 of the California Corporations Code03 applies California
law to all the internal affairs of a foreign corporation if (a) a majority
of its stock is held in California and is not traded over a national
securities exchange, and (b) at least fifty percent of its "business"
(measured by sales, assets, and payroll) is connected with California.
A California appellate court has upheld the constitutionality of this
statute as applied to impose cumulative voting on a corporation incor-
porated in Utah but lacking any other significant contact with that
state. 2°  Despite these few judicial deviations and the evolution of con-"
flicts theory from "choice-of-law" rules to the modern "balancing of
interests" methodology, the "umbilical tie of the foreign corporation
to the state of its charter" still dominates the determination of state
law applicable to internal corporate affairs. 205
199. 263 F.2d 748 (5th Cir.) (distinguishable because holding based on principles of actiona-
ble fraud in transfer of stock, a transaction not involving internal affairs of corporation), aff'd
on reh'g, 268 F.2d 317 (per curiam), cert. denied, 361 U.-S. 885 (1959).
200. See FLA. STAT. §§ 607.109, .110(2) (1987).
201. See N.Y. Bus. CORp. LAW §§ 719-27, 1315-20 (McKinney 1986).
202. International Ticket Scale Corp. v. United States, 165 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1948); Interna-
tional Paper Co. v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 891 (Ct. Cl. 1950). See generally Kozyris, supra
note 196, at 66-76.
203. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1977).
204. Wilson v. Louisiana-Pac. Resources, Inc., 138 Cal. App. 3d 216, 187 Cal. Rptr. 852
(1982).
205. In his 1985 review of the status of the internal affairs doctrine, Professor Kozyris noted
over 100 cases applying the internal affairs doctrine during the preceding 25 years. See Kozyris,
supra note 196. See also, e.g., Gregg v. United States Indus., 715 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir. 1983);
Jacobs v. Adams, 601 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1979) (applying Florida law as law of state of incorpo-
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The internal affairs doctrine also is expressly entrenched in many
states' corporation laws, including Florida's. The Model Business
Corporation Act, adopted by many states, provides: "This Act does
not authorize this state to regulate the organization or internal affairs
of a foreign corporation authorized to transact business in this
state. ' '2 06 The Florida General Corporation Act expressly excludes a
"foreign corporation" from its definition of "corporation" for all
purposes.20 7 In addition, section 607.304, which requires foreign cor-
porations to qualify to transact business in Florida, provides that
"nothing contained in [the Florida General Corporation Act] shall be
construed to authorize this state to regulate the organization or the
internal affairs of such corporation."2 0 When interpreting internal af-
fairs in light of CTS Corp., this provision conflicts directly with sec-
tion 607.110 of the Florida General Corporation Act, which applies
the Act to foreign corporations. Under Florida law, however, the en-
actment of the Act implicitly amended section 607.304 of the Florida
General Corporation Act because of the irreconcilable conflict be-
tween them.2°9 The Act creates a conflict between the common law
choice of law rule of a foreign corporation's state of incorporation
and Florida's statutory choice of law rule, which applies the Act to
foreign corporations with a significant relationship to Florida. 2"0
This conflict should be resolved in favor of the internal affairs doc-
trine for a variety of reasons. The historical precedent of the internal
affairs doctrine has created expectations that will be frustrated by en-
forcement of the Act's choice of law provision. These expectations are
held by not only existing shareholders and takeover bidders, but also
by creditors, customers, investors, and suppliers. The Act poses a slip-
pery slope for the application of statutory choice of law provisions to
other intracorporate relationships, such as fiduciary duties, dividend
ration); Bryan v. Brock & Belvins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.) (Georgia law applied), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974); Hausman v. Buckley, 299 F.2d 696 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
885 (1962); Hasan v. Clevetrust Realty Investors, 548 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (modern
conflicts theory rejected), vacated on other grounds, 729 F.2d 372 (6th Cir. 1984); Gadd v. Pear-
son, 351 F. Supp. 895 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (Florida conflicts rule).
206. MODEL BusiNEss CORP. ACT. ANN. 2D § 15.05(c) (West Supp. 1987). The official com-
mentary to the Model Business Corporation Act explains that this provision "preserves the judi-
cially developed doctrine that internal corporate affairs are governed by the state of
incorporation even when the corporation's business and assets are located primarily in other
states." Id.
207. FLA. STAT. § 607.004(5) (1987).
208. Id. § 607.304(1).
209. State v. J.R.M., 388 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 1980).
210. The conflict also presents an issue under the full faith and credit clause of the Constitu-
tion, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, which is discussed elsewhere in this article. See infra text accom-
panying notes 220-30.
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distributions, dissenters' rights, and corporate indemnification. The
internal affairs of a corporation involve an array of interrelationships
among creditors, officers, directors, and shareholders of various clas-
ses-not just two parties to a takeover transaction. As repeatedly ob-
served by the Court, corporate internal affairs need certain, stable,
and uniform regulation to avoid unfair surprise, and to assure predict-
ability in corporate transactions. Those persons who engage in trans-
actions with corporations need to know the rules of the game in
advance, so they can plan their transactions, and assess their corre-
sponding rights and liabilities under standards and procedures that are
fixed and predetermined.
In addition, shareholders expect and require equal treatment with-
out regard to where they reside, where a lawsuit is filed, or where the
corporation has assets or conducts business. The internal affairs doc-
trine enforces the expectations of the founders and incorporators,
who "contracted" for the law of the state of incorporation. Both
modem and traditional conflicts theories attribute substantial weight
to the parties' choice of law, unless it is arbitrary. 21' The validation of
statutory provisions applying state corporate laws to foreign corpora-
tions would subject foreign corporations to regulation under varying
laws of different states based on changing business contacts and un-
controllable factors, such as the residence of its shareholders. A cor-
poration conceivably could satisfy the jurisdictional test set forth in
the Act with respect to several states. If each of these states had a
control-share acquisition act with different procedures and voting
rights consequences, which state's law would control? Compliance
with all the different acts might be a physical impossibility.
The prospect of varying regulation under different states' laws
should trigger invalidation under the commerce clause,2 12 and the sub-
stantial interference with the Williams Act's comprehensive scheme of
federal regulation should invoke supremacy clause preemption. 213 This
conflict of laws will signal a "race to the courthouse." A takeover
bidder for a foreign corporation subject to the Act would most likely
couple the commencement of its tender offer with a suit in the state of
incorporation to enjoin enforcement of the Act and for a declaratory
judgement that the Act is invalid or inapplicable to the foreign corpo-
ration. As discussed below, a Florida court would be required to give
211. See Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123 (1933) (by purchasing shares, share-
holders implicitly agree to be governed by laws of state of incorporation).
212. See infra text accompanying notes 230-55.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 144-78.
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that judgment preclusive effect pursuant to the full faith and credit
clause.214
The obvious legislative cure for this potential invalidity of the Act is
to eliminate its application to foreign corporations. Less drastic alter-
natives might suffice, however. The infirmity in the Act might be
cured by limiting its application to only those foreign corporations
that have amended their articles of incorporation to incorporate the
Act. This cure would be consistent with the law sustaining the validity
of poison pills.215 Also, this would give effect to the "contract" of the
shareholders embodied in the articles of incorporation.
Alternatively, the Act's jurisdictional criteria for foreign corpora-
tions could be tightened so that the Act applies only to pseudo-foreign
corporations. Although the United States Supreme Court has not en-
dorsed this exception to the internal affairs doctrine, other courts
have, and its intrusion on the doctrine is minimal. 216
The Act's application to foreign corporations could be modified to
fit within the parameters of legal precedent upholding the constitu-
tionality of state blue sky laws. 21 7 This might entail requiring every
tender offer made to Florida residents to be registered with the Flor-
ida Division of Securities, and conditioning registration on a determi-
nation that the tender offer's terms and structure are "fair, just, and
equitable" to residents of Florida. 218 This alternative would limit the
Act's scope, however, to transactions with Florida shareholders. 'It
would be similar to the current provisions of the Florida Securities
and Investor Protection Act 21 9 that require the registration of offers to
sell securities to Florida residents, but instead would regulate offers to
purchase securities from Florida residents. Because it would not have
any extraterritorial effect, the regulation would be constitutional, pro-
vided that any delay imposed on the tender offer were reasonable and
definite.
C. Full Faith and Credit and Due Process
As mentioned above, the full faith and credit clause220 may bar
Florida from applying the Act to a foreign corporation. A correlative
214. See infra text accompanying notes 220-30.
215. E.g., Revlon, Inc. v. McAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986);
Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
216. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
217. See, e.g., Merrick v. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock
Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917); Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917).
218. See FLA. STAT. § 517.081(7) (1987).
219. FLA. STAT. § 517.011 (1987).
220. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."
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issue is whether a Florida court must give full faith and credit to a
judgment entered by a court in another jurisdiction regarding the ap-
plicability of the Act to a foreign corporation. The Supreme Court
originally interpreted the full faith and credit clause to require appli-
cation of the law of the state of incorporation to resolve issues involv-
ing the internal affairs of a corporation 221 and treated the clause as a
constitutional conflict of laws rule. Since then, however, courts in-
creasingly have deferred to the law of the forum state. 222
To reflect that trend in deference, the Court has enunciated a mod-
ern rule regarding the application of the full faith and credit clause:
[I]n view of the fact that the forum State is also a sovereign in its
own right, in appropriate cases it may attach paramount importance
to its own legitimate interests. Accordingly, the fact that a choice-of-
law decision may be unsound as a matter of conflicts law does not
necessarily implicate the federal concerns embodied in the Full Faith
and Credit Clause. Rather . . . the Clause should not invalidate a
state court's choice of forum law unless that choice threatens the
federal interest in national unity by unjustifiably infringing upon the
legitimate interests of another State. 2 3
This rule usually results in courts validating the application of the fo-
rum state's law. 224 Accordingly, the full faith and credit clause should
not prohibit Florida from applying the Act to a foreign corporation if
a sufficient relationship exists between Florida and the corporation.
The question will be whether the statutory contacts prescribed by the
Act 225 establish a sufficient relationship. Courts will have to resolve
that factual issue on a case-by-case basis.
221. See, e.g., Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947);
Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935) (residents of New Jersey who are shareholders of a
company incorporated in New York submit themselves to law and jurisdiction of New York);
Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243 (1912).
222. See Alaska Packers Ass'n. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935). There,
the Court held:
Primafacie every state is entitled to enforce in its own courts its own statutes, lawfully
enacted. One who challenges that right, because of the force given to a conflicting
statute of another state by the full faith and credit clause, assumes the burden of
showing . . . that of the conflicting interests involved those of the foreign state are
superior to those of the forum.
Id. at 547-48.
223. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 320 (1981) (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (footnotes omitted).
224. See Weinberg, Choice of Law and Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. Cm. L. REV. 440, 442
(1982).
225. See FLA. STAT. § 607.110(1) (1987).
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The application of the Act to a foreign corporation also raises the
issue whether it violates the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The Court has described this constitutional inquiry as re-
quiring an analysis of whether application of the forum state's law
creates "unfair surprise" to the justified expectations of a party.226 In
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, the court implied that application of
the law of any state that has any "significant" contact or aggregation
of contacts with, and an interest in the controversy will satisfy the due
process requirement. 227 Under this test, the Act seemingly satisfies the
due process requirements because it requires substantive contacts be-
fore it applies to foreign corporations. Nevertheless, CTS Corp. and
MITE clearly proclaim that a state "has no interest in regulating the
internal affairs of foreign corporations ' ' 228 or "in protecting nonresi-
dent shareholders of nonresident corporations. ' 229 Therefore, the ap-
plication of the internal affairs doctrine to the Act leaves Florida
without a legitimate interest in applying the Act to a foreign corpora-
tion. Absent a legitimate interest in the parties or controversy, the ap-
plication of the Act to a foreign corporation arguably violates due
process.
D. Commerce Clause
The commerce clause grants to Congress the power to "regulate
Commerce . . .among the several States. ' 230 The Court has held for
over a century that the negative implication of the commerce clause
limits the states' power to regulate interstate commerce, even in the
absence of federal regulation. 23 1 The Act's application to foreign
corporations23 2 is doomed by Justice Scalia's statement that "[ais long
as a State's corporation law governs only its own corporations and
does not discriminate against out-of-state interests, it should survive
this Court's scrutiny under the Commerce Clause.' '233
226. Allstate Ins. Co., 449 U.S. at 327 (Stevens, J., concurring); Weintraub, Due Process
and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a State's Choice of Law, 44 IOWA L. REv. 449, 457-60
(1959), reprinted in revisedform in R. WEINTRAUn, COMMENTARY ON TIE CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d
ed. 1980).
227. 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981) (plurality opinion). See also Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 377
U.S. 179, 183 (1964); Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 15 (1962) (dicta); Watson v. Em-
ployers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1954).
228. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645-46 (1982) (emphasis added).
229. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1651 (1987) (emphasis omit-
ted).
230. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
231. E.g., Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852).
232. See FLA. STAT. § 607.110 (1987).
233. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1653 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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The Act is a direct assertion of extraterritorial regulation because it
applies to stock acquisitions that occur outside of Florida and do not
involve a Florida corporation or a single Florida resident. 23 4 Statutes
that directly assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over persons or prop-
erty are invalid under the commerce clause.235 The commerce clause
also invalidates state laws that subject interstate commercial activities
to a risk of inconsistent regulation by different states.23 6 Unlike the
Indiana act validated under the commerce clause in CTS Corp., the
Florida law applies to foreign corporations. 27 In CTS Corp., the
Court concluded that the Indiana act did not subject stock acquisi-
tions to inconsistent regulation by different states because it applied
solely to Indiana corporations. "So long as each State regulates voting
rights only in the corporations it has created, each corporation will be
subject to the law of only one State. ' 238 The Court also distinguished
the Indiana act from the Illinois act invalidated under the commerce
clause in MITE, by pointing out that the Indiana act applied only to
corporations having "a substantial number of shareholders in Indi-
ana." 9 The Florida law fails to satisfy this commerce clause condi-
tion.
In addition to prohibiting direct regulation of interstate commerce,
the commerce clause prohibits indirect state regulation of interstate
commerce that either discriminates against or imposes an excessive
burden on interstate commerce. 240 Only incidental burdens on inter-
state commerce are permitted. 24' Thus, the test for commerce clause
validity requires a determination of the legitimate state interests served
by the statute and a balancing of those local interests against the
statute's burden on interstate commerce. In CTS Corp., the Court
held that the "limited extent" of the Indiana act's effect on interstate
commerce was justified by its local interest in "defining the attributes
234. This would be so if the seller(s) and purchaser(s) of shares in a foreign corporation were
all nonresidents of Florida. The residence requirements that trigger the Act are for shareholders
or employees, but the private sale of stock is a transaction that need not involve Florida share-
holders and has nothing to do with the employees. See FLA. STAT. §§ 607.109(4), .110(2) (1987).
235. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642-43 (1982) (plurality); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 775 (1945); Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189, 198-99 (1925).
236. E.g., CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1649; Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State
Liquor Auth., 106 S. Ct. 2080, 2086 (1986); MITE, 457 U.S. at 642.
237. FLA. STAT. § 607.110(2) (1987).
238. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1649.
239. Id. at 1652. This distinction is puzzling, however, because both acts applied to a corpo-
ration having as few as 10% of its shares owned by residents of the state.
240. MITE, 457 U.S. at 643; Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Huron
Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
241. MITE, 457 U.S. at 640.
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of shares in its corporations and in protecting shareholders. '2 42 The
Court also held that the Indiana act operated evenhandedly and did
not discriminate between resident and nonresident shareholders of In-
diana corporations. Like the Florida law, the Indiana act denies vot-
ing rights to acquired shares that cause a shareholder's total voting
power to exceed statutorily prescribed levels, until the corporation's
shareholders vote to give those shares voting rights.
In CTS Corp., the Court based its commerce clause holding on
three key factors. First, the Indiana act's effect on interstate com-
merce was incidental because the act applied only to Indiana corpora-
tions having a substantial number of Indiana shareholders. Second,
the Court attributed great importance to each state's local interest in
regulating the "corporate governance" of corporations formed under
its laws.2 43 The Court relied on the internal affairs doctrine of conflict
of laws as support for this state interest and recognized voting rights
as an internal affair of a domestic corporation. 244 Third, the Court
recognized the state's interest in protecting shareholders from the "co-
ercive aspects" of two-tier tender offers and giving them "an oppor-
tunity to decide collectively whether the resulting change in voting
control of the corporation . . . would be desirable. A change in man-
agement may have important effects on the shareholders' interests. 24
Notably, the importance of these two state interests differed from the
Court's interpretation in MITE, where the Court held that Illinois'
interests in protecting resident shareholders and regulating the internal
affairs of corporations did not outweigh the burden the Illinois act
imposed on interstate commerce. 2" The Court in CTS Corp. distin-
guished this aspect of MITE on two grounds. First, the Illinois act at
issue in MITE applied to foreign corporations, and a state "has no
interest in protecting nonresident shareholders of nonresident corpo-
rations. 2 47 Second, the Indiana act, unlike the Illinois act, applies
only to corporations with a substantial number of shareholders in In-
diana.248 These distinctions imply that a state has a legitimate interest
in protecting resident shareholders of a foreign corporation having a
substantial number of shareholders resident in that state. The distinc-
tions also raise a question regarding what the Court meant by its in-
242. 107 S. Ct. at 1652.
243. Id. at 1651.
244. Id. at 1649. See supra text accompanying notes 179-218.
245. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1651 (emphasis in original).
246. 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982).
247. 107 S. Ct. at 1651.
248. Id. at 1652.
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ference that the scope of the Indiana act's application is limited to
corporations having a substantial number of Indiana residents.
Both the Illinois and Indiana acts applied to a corporation having
only ten percent of its shares owned by residents of that state. The
Indiana act also applied if, alternatively, a corporation had either
10,000 shareholders or ten percent of its shareholders resident in Indi-
ana. The three shareholder tests under the Indiana act were disjunc-
tive. If the Court misread the Indiana act to require 10,000 Indiana
shareholders before that act attached, the Florida law might be invalid
even if its application to foreign corporations is eliminated because it
requires only one of these shareholder levels: (1) 10% of the corpora-
tion's shares are owned by Florida residents; (2) 10% of the corpora-
tion's shareholders are Florida residents; or (3) 1,000 of the
corporation's shareholders are Florida residents. If the Court's refer-
ence in CTS Corp. to substantially more shareholders refers to the
"10,000 shareholder" test, the Act could be invalid because it has
only a 1,000 shareholder test.
The Illinois act differed from the Indiana act in several other im-
portant respects. First, the Illinois act exempted tender offers by a
corporation for its own shares and accordingly it did not evenhand-
edly apply to all tender offers. Second, the Illinois act had extraterri-
torial effect because it applied to both Illinois and foreign
corporations having their principal place of business outside Illinois.
Finally, the Illinois act prohibited certain transactions in interstate
commerce, at least until statutory procedures were observed, and pos-
sibly indefinitely. The Court in CTS Corp. emphasized this last differ-
ence: "We reiterate that this Act does not prohibit any entity-
resident or nonresident-from offering to purchase, or from purchas-
ing, shares in Indiana corporations, or from attempting thereby to
gain control. "249
In summary, the Florida law fails the test of commerce clause valid-
ity administered in CTS Corp. because it applies to foreign corpora-
tions and to nonresident shareholders of foreign corporations. Also,
none of the shareholder nexus tests of the Act assure that "every ap-
plication of the . . . Act will affect a substantial number of [Florida]
residents. ' 2 0 Accordingly, there is no justification for the Act's bur-
den on interstate commerce.
The Act contains a savings clause that apparently is intended to mit-
igate its vulnerability to invalidation. Thus, the Act does not apply to
249. Id. This argument understates the economic reality of the Indiana Act's effect, as Dy-
namics contended. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
250. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1652 (discussing the Indiana Act).
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a foreign corporation if the law of its state of incorporation is ex-
pressly inconsistent with the Act. 25' The savings clause might protect
the Act from commerce clause invalidation by insuring that control
share acquisitions are not subject to a risk of inconsistent regulation
by different states. 2 2 However, the savings clause only resolves incon-
sistencies with a foreign corporation's state of incorporation and does
not purport to surrender jurisdiction to any other state that might
claim to have the same or a greater relationship to the corporation
than Florida. Because the jurisdictional test applicable to foreign cor-
porations under the Act permits at least a few states to have concur-
rent substantial relationships to a foreign corporation, the savings
clause does not prevent a risk of inconsistent state regulation.
In its more liberal version, the internal affairs doctrine requires only
that the internal affairs of a corporation be governed by the corporate
laws of a single jurisdiction-whether that jurisdiction is the state of
incorporation or the state having the most substantial relationship to
the corporation and its shareholders. 25 3 If a foreign corporation's state
of incorporation observes the liberal version of the internal affairs
doctrine, the savings clause is needless, if it observes the "state-of-
incorporation" version, the savings clause is partially ineffective. In
any event, the savings clause raises interpretative questions. The Act
does not specify when a home state's laws will be considered inconsis-
tent with provisions of the savings clause. A related ambiguity is the
requirement that the home state's law must be expressly inconsistent.
The home state's law might need to specifically state that no other
state can regulate control-share acquisitions involving its corpora-
tions. Or, it may be sufficient that the home state lack a takeover law.
If the home state has a takeover law that is different yet consistent
with the Florida Act, such as the Affiliated Transactions Law, the
clause leaves unclear whether that would be expressly inconsistent
with the Act.
If the savings clause is not enough to protect the Act's application
to foreign corporations from being unconstitutional, the Act could
possibly be severed. Generally, courts will sever the invalid provision
assuming that the legislature would have been content to enact the law
without the invalid provision. 2 4 This rule of law bodes well for the
Act because as originally adopted by the Florida Legislature it did not
251. FLA. STAT. § 607.110(3) (1987).
252. See supra text accompanying note 238.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 196-97.
254. Eastern Air Lines v. Department of Revenue, 455 So. 2d 311, 317 (Fla. 1984); Barndol-
tar v. Sunset Realty Corp., 379 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (Fla. 1979); Small v. Sun Oil Co., 222 So. 2d
196, 199 (Fla. 1969).
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apply to foreign corporations. 211 Accordingly, if the Act's foreign cor-
poration provisions are held invalid, the balance of the Act could be
severed from the invalid provision and given effect.
E. Due Process and Equal Protection
The Act deprives buyers and sellers of stock of certain liberties and
property rights. The ensuing discussion analyzes whether those liber-
ties and property rights are protected by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.2 16 Also considered is whether the Act creates
classifications that deprive any person of equal protection of the law
as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. 2 7 If accorded the same
judicial scrutiny given to statutes that restrain personal liberty, the
Act is susceptible to constitutional challenge. Nevertheless, those who
would question the constitutionality of the Act under the fourteenth
amendment should heed the warning of the United States Supreme
Court: "In applying the Equal Protection Clause to social and eco-
nomic legislation, we give great latitude to the legislature in making
classifications. ' 28 In the past thirty years, the Court has generally re-
frained from invalidating a state economic regulation based on the
due process clause.
The Act affects the rights of existing shareholders and prospective
stock purchasers to enter into contracts for the sale of control shares.
The sale and purchase of control shares is restricted because the Act
imposes an automatic forfeiture of voting rights that can be restored
only through its procedures. This restriction burdens persons wishing
to buy control shares, existing major shareholders desiring to sell con-
trol shares, and even minority shareholders who desire to sell their
shares pursuant to a tender offer or otherwise. Accordingly, the Act
deprives these persons of their fourteenth amendment rights to free-
dom of contract and alienation of property:
It cannot be doubted that among the civil rights intended to be
protected from discriminatory state action by the Fourteenth
255. House Staff Analysis, supra note 6, at 5.
256. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The fourteenth amendment guarantees that a state shall
not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id. (emphasis added). The
Act applies only to corporations that have qualified to transact business in Florida. FLA. STAT. §
607.1 10(l)(a) (1987). The affected corporations will therefore be within the jurisdiction of Flor-
ida, and thus will be protected by the equal protection clause. See Connecticut Gen. Life Ins.
Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938).
257. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
258. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
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Amendment are the rights to acquire, enjoy, own and dispose of
property. Equality in the enjoyment of property rights was regarded
by the framers of that Amendment as an essential pre-condition to
the realization of other basic civil rights and liberties which the
Amendment was intended to guarantee.2 9
The term "liberty" in the Amendment "denotes not merely freedom
from bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual to con-
tract."12 6
Further, the Act deprives control share buyers and sellers of prop-
erty rights. It deprives selling shareholders of the control premium
value of their stock 26' and buyers of voting rights unless the other
shareholders approve those rights. The Act also deprives interested
shareholders of the right to vote on whether control shares receive
voting rights2 62 and, effectively, who will manage the corporation.
Ironically, the shareholders with the very most at stake in the matter
are disfranchised.
Absent infringement of a "fundamental right ' 2 63 or use of a "sus-
pect classification," the "rational basis" test is used to determine
whether a state law violates the due process or equal protection guar-
antees.264 With respect to substantive due process, the test is a rather
lax one: whether a statute has a real and substantial relationship to a
legitimate state purpose.2 65 Due process only bars a state from exercis-
ing its police power in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable man-
ner. With respect to equal protection, the rational basis test is whether
259. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 10 (1948), quoted in Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp.,
405 U.S. 538, 544 (1972). The Court in Lynch stated, "[T]he dichotomy between personal liber-
ties and property rights is a false one. Property does not have rights. People have rights. The
right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right
to travel, is in truth a 'personal' right ..... Id. See also Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
(1897).
260. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
261. See generally Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evi-
dence, 11 J. FIN. EcON. 5 (1983). A contributing factor to the unconstitutionality of the Illinois
Act was that "[s]hareholders [were] deprived of the opportunity to sell their shares at a pre-
mium." Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982).
262. FLA. STAT. § 607.109(3) (1987).
263. A fundamental right is one explicitly or impliedly guaranteed by the Constitution. See
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973).
264. Id. at 40, 44 (equal protection); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (equal
protection); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (equal protec-
tion); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 596 (1962) (due process); Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) (due process).
265. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962); Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934); Ligget Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 113 (1928).
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the statutory classification furthers some legitimate state purpose. 2 66
In assessing the legitimacy of a statutory purpose, the courts now
seem to focus on the articulated purpose of the statute. 267
The Act does not include a statement of legislative intent to evi-
dence its purpose. However, the legislative staff analysis indicates that
its purposes were to protect minority shareholders from coercive two-
tier tender offers, 261 to create a disincentive for existing Florida corpo-
rations to reincorporate in other states, and to attract foreign corpora-
tions to reincorporate in Florida. 269
Are these legitimate state interests? The answer is less than clear.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized a state's interest in
protecting its residents in securities transactions. 270 On the other hand,
the Court has decreed that a state "has no legitimate interest in pro-
tecting nonresident shareholders" of nonresident corporations .271
Business climate enhancement purposes, such as inducing businesses
to incorporate in a state, have not been approved as a state interest
served by control share acquisition acts. 272 A federal district court has
ruled that protection of local economic interests was not a state inter-
est, served by Missouri's control share acquisition act because it did
nothing to actually protect local economic interests. 27  Thus,
266. San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 411 U.S. at 40. See also McGinnis v. Royster, 410
U.S. 263, 277 (1973) (the legitimate state purpose need not be the primary purpose of the stat-
ute).
267. In the early years of rational basis analysis of economic regulation, the courts looked
behind a statute to determine its true purpose and actively reviewed whether the statute or classi-
fication was reasonably related to achieving that purpose. E.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
(1897). These precedents are now discredited as reflecting an era of judicial interventionism. This
approach to state economic regulation was followed by a "hands off" approach to the equal
protection clause. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) ("[We] give great latitude to the legisla-
ture .. "). In the past 25 years, the pronouncements of the Court have required "some ra-
tional relationship to legitimate state purposes." San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 411 U.S. at
40.
268. A two-tier tender offer typically involves a partial tender offer at a premium price for a
controlling stake of a target corporation (but less than all its shares) followed by a second tender
offer for the remaining shares at a substantially lower price.
269. House Staff Analysis, supra note 6, at 2, 4-5.
270. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1651-52 (1987) (Indiana Act);
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982) (Illinois Act); Lemieux v. Young, 211 U.S. 489
(1908) (blue sky laws).
271. MITE, 457 U.S. at 644. Accord CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1651; Terry v. Yamashita,
643 F. Supp. 161 (D. Haw. 1986); Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
272. Yamashita, 643 F. Supp. at 166 ("purely speculative"). But see Gelco v. Coniston Part-
ners, 652 F. Supp 829, 842 (D. Minn. 1986), vacated in part on other grounds, 811 F.2d 414 (8th
Cir. 1987).
273. Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, 1417 (W.D. Mo. 1985). See also Fleet Aerospace
Corp. v. Holderman, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986) (only speculation that every acquirer will
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"[s]hielding in-state industries from out-of-state competition is almost
never a legitimate local purpose, ' 2 74 and shielding local corporations
from acquisition by out-of-state buyers (and resulting relocation out-
of-state) presumably is not a legitimate purpose. 275 Although Florida
need not adopt the least restrictive means2 76 to achieve the Act's legiti-
mate purposes, the Act's regulation of control share acquisitions must
be reasonably related to those purposes. The Act should not regulate
every control-share acquisition without distinction as to whether it is a
two-tiered tender offer or coercive to minority shareholders, whether
it will result in a change of managerial control, or whether it will ad-
versely affect the local economy or business climate of the state. A
statute prohibiting two-tier tender offers to Florida shareholders or
regulating the substantive terms of tender offers would suffice to as-
sure that shareholders are not coerced in their investment decisions. If
shareholder protection through disclosure is a purpose, the filing of
the acquiring person statement (APS) should be required of all acquir-
ing persons. Currently, only buyers who desire voting rights need to
file an APS. A corporation repurchasing its own shares presumably
would never file an APS because it does not care about voting
rights.277 If collective shareholder approval of changes in management
or business location is a purpose of the Act, Florida could require
shareholder approval of those actions through regular procedures for
shareholder action. 27 The Florida legislature could protect Florida cit-
izens and local economy against business relocation attributable to
mergers and acquisitions, a seemingly per se invalid purpose, by en-
acting laws imposing excise taxes, protecting employees through man-
datory severance pay, or requiring advance notice of business
relocations. If direct regulation of these economic mischiefs would be
invalid under the commerce clause, indirect regulation through the
relocate the target corporation's business), vacated and remanded sub nom. Ohio v. Fleet Aero-
space Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1949 (1987). The Missouri statute did not limit its application to corpo-
rations having a minimum level of employment and exempted a corporation's purchases of its
own shares without regard to the effect on the local economy. Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.407 (Supp.
1987).
274. Maine v. Taylor, 106 S. Ct. 2440, 2453 (1986).
275. Protecting local corporations could be a "true" purpose of the Act. The acquisition of
a local corporation by a larger out-of-state corporation often adversely affects the local economy
because of the ensuing business consolidation activities such as relocation of corporate execu-
tives, corporate headquarters, and manufacturing facilities.
276. The "least restrictive means" analysis is part of the "close scrutiny" test that is applica-
ble only if the state action impinges the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights. San Anto-
nio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 51 (1973).
277. A Florida corporation may never vote treasury shares (shares that were issued and out-
standing that are presently owned by the issuing corporation). FLA. STAT. § 607.097(2) (1987).
278. See FLA. STAT. §§ 607.181, .221 (1987).
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Act is unreasonable and only fortuitously related to those purposes.
The Act will violate the equal protection clause if it creates classifi-
cations that are not rationally related to a proper governmental pur-
pose. Of course, the courts apply a relatively loose standard of
"reasonableness" to classifications in economic legislation. 279 Also, a
statutory classification will be presumed rational if any set of facts
reasonably can be conceived to justify the classification and the classi-
fication is not totally unrelated to the statutory purpose. 280
The Act's classifications of persons who are subject to the Act seem
unrelated to any legitimate purpose described above. The Act does not
even mention "coercive two-tier tender offers"-the primary articu-
lated purpose of the Act-nor does it otherwise limit its application
only to that method of a control-share acquisition. The transactions
regulated by the Act are not confined to changes in control that result
in corporate relocation. In fact, the Act does not even require a
change of control as a condition of regulation. The levels of total vot-
ing power that trigger control-share status are arbitrary and do not
have any common significance to the corporations subject to the Act.
The acquisition of 33% of the voting power will never be as signifi-
cant to some corporations as the acquisition of even 10% of the total
voting power is to others.
The Act subjects a corporation to its regulation based on the num-
ber and residence of its shareholders. This classification lacks any re-
lationship whatsoever to the economic importance of the corporation
to Florida or its shareholders' need for protection. 28' A corporation
with only a few shareholders could be more economically important
to the state than a bankrupt corporation with over 10,000 sharehold-
ers. Minority shareholders of corporations with fewer than 100 share-
holders could be more susceptible to coercion than a minority
shareholder of a corporation whose shares are traded on a national
securities exchange.
Even assuming the classifications in the Act are reasonable, they are
not rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The Act's classifi-
cations are concurrently overinclusive and underinclusive. The Act
does not embrace every two-tier tender offer. A two-tier tender offer
by a corporation to repurchase its own shares would not, as a practi-
cal matter, be affected by the Act. 2 2 Also, a two-tier tender offer in-
279. E.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
280. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
281. Foreign corporations are subject to a higher standard. The Act requires 500 employees
resident in Florida and a Florida payroll exceeding $5 million. FLA. STAT. § 607.110 (1987).
282. The corporation would be subject to the automatic forfeiture of voting rights, but cor-
porations cannot vote treasury shares anyway. See supra note 277.
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volving a Florida corporation having fewer than 100 shareholders
would not be subject to the Act. Furthermore, a two-tier tender offer
supported by the management of the target corporation would not be
subject to the Act because the bylaws can be amended to escape the
Act.2 13 On the other hand, many good faith transactions not involving
coercion or two-tier pricing will be subject to the Act. For example,
tender offers for all the shares of a corporation are subject to the Act,
as are privately negotiated purchases of control shares. These transac-
tions do not present any of the ills the Act seeks to thwart. The classi-
fications are similarly unsuited to other possible legitimate purposes.
The Act's classification of regulated corporations is unreasonable.
As mentioned above, the classification is based primarily on the num-
ber and residence of shareholders. The effect is to discriminate be-
tween corporations with fewer than 100 shareholders and those with
100 or more shareholders. The corporation's total number of share-
holders seems unrelated to the protection needed by a single share-
holder. With respect to corporations with at least 100 shareholders,
the Act is overinclusive, or at least superfluous. It requires corpora-
tions that are subject to the Williams Act to observe the same statu-
tory procedures as corporations that are not, even though the
Williams Act requires the filing of identical information as included in
an APS.284
The Act also causes the Florida General Corporation Act to dis-
criminate between methods of corporate acquisition. For example, a
merger or sale of substantially all assets only requires approval of a
majority of the shares entitled to vote on the transaction. A control-
share acquisition that has practically the same consequences as a
merger, however, seems to require approval of a majority of the
shares owned by the minority shareholders.2 85 No reason exists for this
different standard of shareholder approval. Correspondingly, the
Florida General Corporation Act discriminates in the dissenters' rights
applicable to a control-share acquisition versus a merger, consolida-
tion, or asset sale or exchange.2 86 This discriminatory classification of
dissenting shareholders based on the form of the corporate acquisition
affects both dissenting shareholders and their corporations, and does
not appear to be reasonably related to the purpose of protecting
shareholders.
283. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.081, .109(5) (1987).
284. Generally, a corporation will be subject to the Williams Act if it has more than 500
shareholders and $5 million worth of total assets. 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(g), 78m(d) (1982).
285. Compare FLA. STAT. § 607.109(a)(b) (1987) with id. § 607.221(2).
286. Id. §§ 607.109(11), .244, .247. See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
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As discussed briefly above, the Act also unreasonably discriminates
between control-share acquisitions that would actually result in a
change of management or a business relocation and those that would
not. The quantity of voting power a purchaser acquires does not nec-
essarily determine whether a change of control or business relocation
will occur. For example, the acquisition of one Florida corporation by
another is unlikely to result in a business relocation. In some corpora-
tions a relatively small percentage of voting power will represent
working control and in others anything less than 50%Vo will not affect
control. The Act regulates the latter, but not the former.
In summary, the constitutionality of the Act under the due process
and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment is open to
question. Although courts are timid to invalidate economic legislation
based on the due process clause, the Act's scheme of regulation seems
fraught with opportunity to challenge the assertion that the Act bears
a reasonable and substantial relationship to its articulated purposes.
The Act seems even more troublesome with respect to its infringement
on equal protection. The classifications created by the Act, on its face
and in operation, are both under- and over-inclusive. Although eco-
nomic regulations do not require "mathematical nicety" or the avoid-
ance of all inequality, the Constitution does require a reasonable basis
for statutory discriminations. 2 7 Measured thusly, the constitutionality
of the Act's classifications seem problematic.
IV. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Assuming, arguendo, that the Act is constitutional, the question re-
mains whether the State of Florida should regulate stock transfers be-
tween willing buyers and sellers. Traditionally, states have regulated
the internal affairs of corporations organized under their laws. 288 Al-
though the Act purportedly regulates only the internal affairs of Flor-
ida corporations and foreign corporations having a substantial nexus
with Florida,28 9 the Act in reality regulates stock transactions.
The regulation of stock transactions that achieve the same result as
a merger, consolidation, or a sale or exchange of all or substantially
all the assets of a corporation is a neutral and justifiable objective. To
do so in a way that discriminates against one form of transaction and
jeopardizes individual economic rights is quite a different matter. The
Act goes too far in imposing a forfeiture of voting rights that are re-
287. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
288. See supra notes 179-211 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
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coverable only by an expensive and burdensome procedure that favors
management. The expressed purposes of the Act do not require these
extreme means.
True, tender offers normally are on a short time schedule and some
two-tier tender offers coerce shareholders into selling their shares out
of concern that they will be left in a minority position with a control-
ling shareholder. 290 In these instances, shareholders are forced to sell
their shares regardless of the corporate control issues inherent in the
transaction. In this respect, the Act achieves a worthwhile purpose.
But not every tender offer is followed by a second-step transaction. 291
Florida already regulates the way in which tender offerors may use
their voting power to effect fundamental corporate changes. 292 If regu-
lation of two-tier tender offers is required, the Florida Legislature
should enact a law to regulate those offers specifically.
The Act disserves the stated purpose of shareholder protection and
distorts shareholder choice. The Act gives management, who other-
wise would have no direct role in a tender offer except for providing
an opinion on its merits to the shareholders, the opportunity to pre-
vent shareholder choice by using an array of promanagement provi-
sions against a tender offer. Corporations are fueled by capital, and
capital is driven by shareholders, and those with the greatest stake in
the outcome historically have been free to exercise corporate control
within the limits of fiduciary responsibility. The principal tool of cor-
porate control is the right to vote, to select management, and influ-
ence fundamental corporate decisions. The Legislature should not
interfere in the lawful choices of those whose capital is at risk. Share-
holder protection is one thing, but management entrenchment is quite
another. Even if the shareholders vote, the Act permits a minority of
so-called disinterested shareholders to block a majority of sharehold-
ers from selling their stock. This is corporate folly and contrary to the
economic theory of corporate democracy by which shareholders his-
torically have invested in corporations. Apparently, the State of Flor-
ida prefers existing managers over prospective major shareholders.
The State has no basis on which to make such an arbitrary choice.
The Act effectuates a forfeiture of property rights and a direct re-
straint on the alienation of property. The Act prevents the alienation
of stock by denying voting rights, and voting rights do not exist in a
vacuum, rather they are attached to securities. Florida's legitimate in-
290. House Staff Analysis, supra note 6, at 1-2.
291. SEC. & EXCH. CoMM'N's ADVISORY COMM. ON TENDER OFFERS, The Economics of Par-
tial and Two-Tier Tender Offers, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,755 (1984).
292. See FLA. STAT. § 607.184 (1987).
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terest in promoting local industry and economic growth should not be
twisted to inflict its judgment on controlling shareholders with respect
to who is best to serve as custodian of the shareholders' corporate
business.
The Act seeks to insulate Florida corporations and foreign corpora-
tions having a nexus with Florida from corporate takeovers. Compa-
nies whose activities and ownership are national in scope should not
be given protection by a state where the production facilities are lo-
cated. The argument that anti-takeover laws protect local communi-
ties from plant closings and unemployment is unfounded when
friendly acquisitions, leveraged buy outs, and internal corporate
downsizing and restructuring that have the same effects go unregu-
lated. These activities are not affected by the Act.
Congress is likely to pass major tender offer legislation in light of
CTS Corp.293 and the recent insider trading scandals. The federal gov-
ernment is the proper forum for establishing national rules governing
the national market for corporate control. Congress is less likely to be
influenced by local economic pressures and interests. U.S. Representa-
tives Dingell and Markey, U.S. Senators Proxmire and Riegle, and
U.S. Representatives Lent and Rinaldo have introduced bills to ad-
dress tender offers and other related matters.294 Congress may outlaw
"greenmail ' 295 and amend Rule 13(d) of the Exchange Act 296 to re-
quire bidders to disclose within one day, rather than ten, their acquisi-
tion of five percent of a company's stock. Other legislative proposals
include lengthening the twenty business day minimum period for hold-
ing open tender offers, limiting "creeping tender offers" that result
from open market purchases, prohibiting "street sweeping" by bid-
ders after the termination of a tender offer, and prohibiting corporate
anti-takeover defenses such as poison pills and "golden parachutes."
V. GUIDELINES FOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE ACT
A corporation that is subject to the Act should decide whether it
desires to take advantage of various elections allowed under the law.
First, the corporation should decide\whether it wishes to be subject to
the Act.297 If it does, the corporation should answer two additional
293. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
294. H.R. 2668, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S. 1323, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R.
2172, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
295. Greenmail refers to a target corporation's payment to an aggressor to buy back ac-
quired shares at a premium in exchange for the agressor's agreement not to pursue a takeover.
296. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982).
297. Corporations may amend their bylaws or articles of incorporation to elect not to be
covered by the law. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
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questions: (1) whether it wishes to recognize statutory dissenters'
rights when control shares constituting a majority of its total voting
power are accorded full voting rights; and (2) whether it wishes to
have redemption rights with respect to control shares that are not
given full voting rights or for which an APS is not filed.
Whether a corporation desires or requires the protection afforded
by the Act depends on its existing takeover posture and its future ob-
jectives. Some corporations already might have effective takeover de-
terrents, such as classified stock, cumulative voting, staggered
directorships, or anti-takeover provisions like poison pills in their arti-
cles of incorporation. These corporations should evaluate whether
these tactical measures are sufficient without resort to the Act. Some
corporations might favor being acquired for sufficient value, and
might therefore avoid the Act with its possibility for impairment of
friendly takeovers. 29 Of course, a corporation may elect at any time
not to be governed by the Act merely by amending its bylaws, which
usually requires only the approval of the board of directors. There-
fore, most corporations should not opt out of the Act, reserving the
ever present right to do so. A corporation that remains subject to the
Act seemingly would desire redemption power over control shares.
The redemption power need not be exercised, but the existence of it
gives the corporation the ability to eliminate a pesky, avaricious share-
holder without relenting to greenmail.
Persons seeking to acquire a corporation that is subject to the Act
should first seek a friendly acquisition. All else being equal, friendly
suitors will prefer some other form of acquisition besides a stock sale,
principally to avoid the discriminatory voting and dissenters' rights
provisions of the Act that do not apply to mergers or assets sales.
With respect to hostile tender offers, every ardent bidder should sue
to enjoin and invalidate the Act concurrently with the commencement
of its tender offer.29 If the tender offer involves a foreign corpora-
tion, the suit will undoubtedly receive a warmer welcome in the for-
eign corporation's home state. An APS should be filed at the
commencement of the tender offer along with a specific request for a
record date, meeting date, and proxy material for the shareholders
meeting that will ensue.
298. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
299. Complaints have already been filed in Florida and New York by CRTF Corp., a wholly
owned subsidiary of Campeau Corp., a Canadian corporation, which was formed for the pur-
pose of acquiring Federated Department Stores, Inc., a Delaware corporation with its principal
offices in Cincinnati, Ohio. CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't. Stores, Inc., No. 88-0133 (S.D.
Fla. filed Jan. 25, 1988); Wall St. J., Mar. 7, 1988, at 4, col.e2.
CONTROL-SHARE ACQUISITIONS
Timing then becomes crucial. The tender offeror should avoid ac-
quiring any shares before the record date of the shareholders meeting.
Shares acquired before the record date will not have any voting rights
unless approved by the pre-existing shareholders. The proposed accep-
tance of tendered shares needs to be carefully timed to avoid any with-
drawal rights available to tendering shareholders under the Exchange
Act. Naturally, consideration should be given to a conditional tender
offer, dependent on the receipt of full voting rights. Further, if inter-
ested shares are determined on the record date for the shareholder
meeting, tendered shares should not be accepted until after that date.
One author has suggested having the tender offer transmittal letter ir-
revocably appoint the bidder as proxy for the tendering shareholder,
effective on acceptance of the shares for payment.) ° Then, to avoid
the issue whether its shares are "interested" because of concurrent
proxy solicitation, a bidder should separate its proxy solicitation from
the tender offer. Rule 14a-2(a)(2) under the Exchange Act exempts
from the proxy rules a solicitation by a beneficial owner, which the
bidder will be when the proxy becomes effective. However, this ar-
rangement poses logistical problems with respect to shares held in
street name or with a clearing agency. Finally, the acquirer should dis-
close in its APS that it intends to seek voting rights for as much of the
target corporation's stock that it would ever consider purchasing. If
the bidder receives shareholder approval for a maximum range of vot-
ing power, further shareholder approval does not seem to be required
by the Act for later stock purchases.
VI. CONCLUSION
Acknowledging its articulated purpose to protect the investors, the
Act is really a thinly veiled attempt by the Florida Legislature to pro-
tect local business. This activity, however, will probably provide addi-
tional incentive to the SEC and Congress to seek preemptive federal
legislation.01 The effect of congressional action might upset the bal-
ance underlying the Williams Act that has functioned reasonably well
over the past twenty years. Moreover, the Act probably is unconstitu-
tional as applied to foreign corporations, and the entire Act might be
struck down if challenged in court on constitutional grounds. Until
then, buyers of stock of corporations regulated by the Act must at-
tempt to comply with its provisions, which are ambiguous as applied
300. 9 Sec. & Fed. Corp. L. Rep. (Clark Boardman) 50-55 (1987).
301. SEC Chairman David S. Ruder believes federal law should preempt state laws that un-
duly interfere with free transferability of securities. Chairman Ruder Sees National Approach to
Takeovers, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1256, at 8 (1987).
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to most situations. The Act likely will give rise to a torrent of judicial
scrutiny that will determine its ultimate scope and validity.
ADDENDUM
Subsequent to the preparation of this Article, the Florida Legislature amended the Act in the
1988 regular session to provide that family members shall not be deemed to be part of a
"group" if such persons act together in exercising or directing the exercise of the voting power
of an issuing public corporation (whether through a voting trust, shareholder agreement, or oth-
erwise) if all the parties are related by blood or marriage, or are trustees or personal representa-
tives of a person, and if each party has been a shareholder since July 1, 1987. Ch. 83-111, 1988
Fla. Laws - (to be codified at FLA. STAT. 607.109(2)(f)). This is consistent with the argument
that the mere formation of a group should not constitute a control share acquisition. The acqui-
sition of voting power after the formation of a group through the acquisition of stock, however,
should be subject to the Act; otherwise, six related purchasers owning nominal amounts of stock
before July 1, 1987, could agree to act in concert and then purchase 9% of the'outstanding stock
of an issuing public corporation and not be subject to the Act. The result probably would be an
unintended consequence of the amendment to the Act.
The Act also was amended to provide that the voting trustee of any voting trust shall not be
deemed an "acquiring person." This amendment is intended to protect family-owned businesses.
